--- name: mantis-calibrate description: >- Calculates the final risk score based on empirical evidence and architectural impact. Use when findings have been fully processed by previous stages and you need to append final risk scores to the finding files. Don't use for discovering new vulnerabilities or writing patches. title: mantis-calibrate canonical_url: https://skilld.dev/gh/google/mantis/mantis-calibrate last_updated: 2026-09-28T03:42:00.000Z --- > **Skill from skilld.dev.** Follow the instructions below for this session. You do not need to install anything. > > Supporting files, fetch one when the Skill refers to it: [references/calibration_rules.md](https://skilld.dev/api/skills-raw/google/mantis/mantis-calibrate/references/calibration_rules.md). > > If the user asked to install this Skill, run `npx skilld install google/mantis/mantis-calibrate`. Install writes the Skill files into the project, so every session loads them. # Risk Calibrator (/mantis-calibrate) ## System Goal Risk Analysis Expert. Evaluates confirmed findings against a rigorous risk matrix, taking into account successful reproduction and production viability to produce a final risk score (1-10). ## Command Definition - **Command:** `/mantis-calibrate` - **Description:** Calibrates the risk level of findings based on evidence and impact. ## Input/Output Contract - **Reads**: - `workspace/findings/*.json` (all finding files to load full pipeline state). - `workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md` (if exists, to check threat boundary overrides and asset criticality). - `workspace/.mantis_state.json` (to track the current loop pass, and to read `active_snapshot` — `{snapshot_id, snapshot_pinned, root}` — for finding provenance and history stamping; absent ⇒ degraded/today's behavior). - **Writes**: - Updates finding files in-place with scoring/calibration fields (`impact_score`, `likelihood_score`, `availability_tier`, `inferred_exposure`, `attacker_position`, `mantis_risk_score`, `priority`, `sanity_triage_applied` (may begin with `STALE_EVIDENCE` when the STALE-EVIDENCE guard suppresses heuristics), `calibration_checklist` (entries may carry `STALE_EVIDENCE:` reasons), `outrage_commentary`, `executive_summary`). Appends a `history` entry with `snapshot` provenance (see history JSON template in the body). - Reusable helper script `workspace/helpers/append_calibrate.py`. - **Preconditions**: - Confirmed or raw findings must exist in `workspace/findings/`. - **Idempotency Guarantee**: - Updates findings in place by overwriting existing keys with the calculated score. Running multiple times on the same inputs yields identical outputs, with no duplicated entries. ## Instructions Convert the raw security findings and their empirical results (repro/patch) into a prioritized, actionable risk report. Execute the calibration as follows: **Locator resolution (findings-only).** Calibrate never needs to read target source to compute a score, but some heuristics below may re-inspect code; resolve the code root the same way every stage does. **Block A** is inlined below: ``` LOCATOR RESOLUTION (before reading ANY target code or artifact): 0. ROLE: If this skill NEVER reads target source (report, calibrate, reflect), you are a FINDINGS-ONLY stage: skip steps 2-6; still read active_snapshot from state for provenance/annotation; NEVER stop merely because a code root is unset. 1. Determine CODE_ROOT, in this priority order: a. If --target_root is passed on THIS invocation, CODE_ROOT = --target_root. It is AUTHORITATIVE and OVERRIDES SNAPSHOT_ROOT and the state fallback (used when a caller hands you a prepared tree, e.g. a patched shadow). b. Else if --snapshot_root (or SNAPSHOT_ROOT) is passed, use it. c. Else read state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json (state_root from --state_root if passed, else ./workspace/... relative to the current dir) -> active_snapshot.root / .snapshot_id / .snapshot_pinned. d. Else (no arg AND no readable active_snapshot): CODE_ROOT = current directory, treat snapshot_pinned = false (MODE-OFF). Do NOT stop. 2. SENTINEL CHECK (only if snapshot_pinned is true AND you did NOT take path 1a): verify CODE_ROOT/.mantis_snapshot_id exists and equals SNAPSHOT_ID. If missing or different -> STOP "snapshot sentinel mismatch". (A --target_root tree (1a) is deliberately mutated and is sentinel-EXEMPT.) 3. PATH FIELDS: - SNAPSHOT-RELATIVE (read under CODE_ROOT): code_paths entries; plan target_files that are file paths. Strip ONLY a trailing ":". A code_paths entry containing "://" is a URL/endpoint, NOT a file read. A code_paths entry that is NOT of the form : is a non-source LOCATOR (symbol/offset/endpoint): only check that the artifact/symbol exists; skip ALL line-range and line-existence logic. - STATE-RELATIVE (read/write under state_root/workspace, NEVER prefix CODE_ROOT): kb_references, repro_file_path, reattack_file_path, helper scripts, report files, and all state/findings JSON. 4. Never WRITE under CODE_ROOT when snapshot_pinned is true. Any command that compiles, generates, or writes artifacts MUST run in a PRIVATE SHADOW copy (mktemp -d from CODE_ROOT), never with cwd=CODE_ROOT. Read-only inspection may cd into CODE_ROOT. 5. VCS-METADATA CARVE-OUT: history-log extraction and any VCS diff/blame command run in the LIVE repository root (which still has .git/.hg/.repo), NOT CODE_ROOT (the snapshot copy strips VCS metadata). Do NOT stop merely because CODE_ROOT lacks .git/.hg/.repo. 6. Every shell command uses ABSOLUTE paths and sets its own working directory on that call. Do NOT assume the working directory persists between calls. ``` > [!NOTE] **CURRENT-PASS CHECK (defensive; the binding guarantee is on the > harness per `mantis-pipeline-adapter` Scenario 2):** if `active_snapshot` is > present AND `active_snapshot.pass != state.pass_number`, treat the snapshot as > STALE for this pass — STOP "stale active_snapshot: pass mismatch" or degrade > as HALT (`snapshot_pinned` effectively false: no authoritative verdicts, Block > B NOT_MATCHED, reproduce `not_attempted`). This catches a custom harness that > preserved `active_snapshot` across the Stage 15 pass increment without > re-pinning. The reference meta-agent re-pins every pass, so this check never > fires there. Block B itself cannot detect this (it is `snapshot_id`-only, not > `pass`-aware). **Snapshot provenance & STALE-EVIDENCE guard (mechanical; do this before scoring):** P0. Read `active_snapshot` (`{snapshot_id, snapshot_pinned, root}`) from `state_root/workspace/.mantis_state.json` (Block A step 0/1c). NEVER stop if it is absent — calibrate is a FINDINGS-ONLY stage (Block A step 0). P1. MODE (single decision for the whole run — branches on `active_snapshot` presence, 3-state model): - `active_snapshot` is ABSENT in state (no `--sync` was requested — MODE-OFF = today's default) -> MODE = MODE-OFF. Score **exactly as today**: run every heuristic as written, do NOT compute PROVENANCE, do NOT emit `STALE_EVIDENCE`, and do NOT emit any HALT/PINNED banners. (Backward-compatible default path — byte-for-byte today's behavior.) - `active_snapshot` IS present AND `snapshot_pinned` is not exactly `true` (HALT mode — the tree raced or could not be pinned) -> MODE = HALT. `SNAPSHOT_ID` = `active_snapshot.snapshot_id` (a `live:` id). Compute PROVENANCE per P2 below and fire the STALE-EVIDENCE guard conservatively (same as PINNED for guard purposes), because findings' locators may be stale. Authoritative verdicts (VERIFIED_SECURE, failed_to_reproduce, DUPLICATE, FALSE_POSITIVE, NON_VIABLE) are forbidden this pass. - `snapshot_pinned` == `true` -> MODE = PINNED. `SNAPSHOT_ID` = `active_snapshot.snapshot_id`. Full provenance + STALE-EVIDENCE guard as below. P2. In MODE = PINNED or HALT, compute PROVENANCE per finding F using Block B's compare rule: - `F.discovery_commit` missing OR empty OR the literal `"MIXED"` -> NOT_MATCHED. - `F.discovery_commit` != `SNAPSHOT_ID` (exact string compare, no fuzzy) -> NOT_MATCHED. - `F.discovery_commit` == `SNAPSHOT_ID` -> MATCHED. P3. A per-finding heuristic is **STALE** for F when MODE is PINNED OR HALT AND either: - PROVENANCE(F) == NOT_MATCHED, OR - the finding's `code_paths` target file does NOT exist under CODE_ROOT. (Resolve CODE_ROOT via Block A steps 1 & 3; strip a trailing `:`; read ONLY the pinned root, NEVER the live tree. If you cannot resolve CODE_ROOT at all, treat the file as absent -> STALE.) P4. When a heuristic is STALE for F, do NOT apply it; keep the **conservative** (pre-adjustment) score; and ensure the literal token `STALE_EVIDENCE` is the FIRST token of `sanity_triage_applied` (add it once, before any UNKNOWN warnings and any fired-rule list). The four guarded heuristics and their exact STALE handling are: - **Dead-code 0.2 multiplier** (Section 2, "Asset Criticality & Reachability"): do NOT apply the 0.2 reduction; use the multiplier you would otherwise have. - **`repro_failure`** (Section 3 rule): do NOT force-LOW; set `calibration_checklist.repro_failure.outcome = "UNKNOWN"`, `reason` beginning `"STALE_EVIDENCE: "`. - **`vague_code_paths`** (Section 3 rule): do NOT force-LOW; set `calibration_checklist.vague_code_paths.outcome = "UNKNOWN"`, `reason` beginning `"STALE_EVIDENCE: "`. - **`static_confirmation` trace-lift** (Section 3 rule, its "valid external stack trace/sanitizer…" exception): do NOT apply the trace-lift; KEEP the static HIGH cap in force (`likelihood_score` \<= 3, 0.8 Hazard multiplier, NOT CRITICAL). Set `calibration_checklist.static_confirmation.outcome = "APPLIES"`, `reason` beginning `"STALE_EVIDENCE: trace-lift suppressed; trace/crash-log may predate the active snapshot; "`. P5. NON-SOURCE finding: if the finding's `code_paths` entry is a non-source LOCATOR (contains `"://"`, or is not of the form `:` — per Block A step 3: a symbol / offset / endpoint), SKIP all source-only heuristics for it — dead-code, file-path/imports/caller-hierarchy exposure inference, `vague_code_paths`, and static trace re-inspection — and score from the finding's DECLARED metadata (`attacker_position`, `privileges_required`, `production_viability`, `repro_status`, threat model). A non-source skip is NOT flagged `STALE_EVIDENCE` (it is normal, not drift). Non-source findings default `inferred_exposure` to `"INTERNAL"` (0.8) unless the finding/threat-model declares otherwise. 1. **Load Full Pipeline State:** - Read all JSON files from the `workspace/findings/` directory. Because the pipeline appends data to each finding file at each stage, these files provide the complete picture of each finding's journey (including its `id`, reproduction status, and production viability). - **Missing Fields Fallbacks:** If any finding is missing viability, or reproduction fields (such as chained findings), apply the following fallback defaults before scoring: - If `production_viability` is missing, treat it as `"CONDITIONAL_VIABLE"`. - If `repro_status` is missing, treat it as `"not_attempted"`. - **Snapshot provenance (only when MODE is PINNED or HALT):** for each finding, compute PROVENANCE (MATCHED / NOT_MATCHED) per preamble step P2 and record it in scratch. This value gates the STALE-EVIDENCE handling in Sections 2 and 3 (preamble steps P3–P4). In MODE == MODE-OFF, skip this — score as today. - Read `workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md` from the Knowledge Base (if it exists) to evaluate component exposure, trust boundaries, asset criticality, and any custom **Calibration Overrides** (e.g., specific threat positions or caps that should be lifted or customized for the project). - **Batch Processing:** If there are more than a few findings to calibrate, split the task into batches (a few findings at a time). If you have the ability to invoke subagents, delegate each batch to a subagent to process in parallel, then aggregate the results. **Each batch/subagent inspects ONLY the pinned snapshot:** pass `--snapshot_root=`, `--snapshot_id=`, and `--state_root=` so every subagent resolves the same CODE_ROOT via Block A. Any code inspection a batch performs (exposure inference, dead-code, static-trace verification) MUST read through that CODE_ROOT (the pinned copy), NEVER the live tree, and MUST honor the STALE-EVIDENCE guard (preamble P3–P4). Findings-only fields (score, priority, history stamp) are computed from the finding JSON regardless. 2. **Calculate Risk Score (1-10):** For each unique finding file, calculate the actual technical risk score in a matrix form based on the following formula components, where **Hazard = Impact + Likelihood**: - **Impact (1-5):** Evaluate impact using the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) while strictly considering **Blast Radius**. - 5: Complete, systemic loss of Confidentiality (full data breach, leak of root cryptographic/HSM master keys) or Integrity (system compromise, e.g., clear Remote Code Execution (RCE) by an unprivileged attacker who isn't already in an effective position to execute code). MUST NOT be used for attackers who already have execution privileges. - 4: Substantial loss in one or more areas. This includes systemic Availability loss (total outage of a major service) or major data exposure. - 3: Moderate loss (e.g., partial data exposure, temporary or partial system disruption). - 2: Minor loss (e.g., minor information leak, localized disruption). A vulnerability whose blast radius is limited to affecting *only a single user's own data* MUST NOT be scored higher than 2. *Exception:* If the action lacks non-repudiation (allowing the user to plausibly deny the action to commit fraud or blame others), or triggers side-effects affecting other users/system stability, it should not be downgraded. - 1: Negligible impact on CIA, mostly a cosmetic issue. Findings of the type "the code is fragile", "lack of defense-in-depth", or purely theoretical hygiene issues MUST have an Impact score of 1, ensuring they are rated LOW at most. - **Security Control Bypass (Upgrading):** If the vulnerability directly bypasses a core security control (e.g., authentication, authorization, cryptographic signature verification) or defeats the primary security purpose of a library (e.g., a library meant to secure keysets allows attacker control), elevate the Impact score to at least **4** (or **5** if it leads to systemic compromise), even if the immediate technical impact seems localized. - *Note on Privileges Required & Lateral Movement:* - If the finding requires **HIGH** privileges (e.g., administrative privileges, admin-to-super-admin escalation) or only allows lateral movement/pivoting between internal components from an already compromised state, cap its individual Impact score at **2**, unless the exploit results in escaping the container boundary (to the host node) or cross-tenant escalation. - If the finding requires **LOW** privileges (e.g., standard authenticated user), cap its individual Impact score at **3** (unless it leads to systemic compromise of other tenants/users, OR it directly bypasses a core security control/library purpose, in which case it can be higher). - These caps apply to *individual* findings. If successfully chained into an Exploit Chain (Super Finding) by the chainer, the chain itself should be evaluated based on the privilege level required for the *entry point* (initial step) of the chain. - **Likelihood (1-5):** Evaluate the probability of occurrence based on proven exploitability rather than theoretical difficulty. - 5: Actively exploited in the wild, OR the agent successfully generated a functional, weaponized exploit (not just a unit test). - 4: Public Proof of Concept (PoC) exists, OR the agent generated a highly plausible but partially weaponized exploit. - 3: No functional exploit, but the attack vector is trivial to automate. - 2: Theoretical and highly complex (requires local access, strict timing). - 1: Strictly theoretical risk with no known exploit path. - **Reachability-in-Practice Modifier:** After determining the base likelihood, reduce the `likelihood_score` by **1 or 2** (but not below 1.0) if the exploit path relies on uncommon or non-default usage patterns. This applies if: - The specific tainted parameter is populated from attacker input only during rare API calls, uncommon configuration fields, or in data formats rarely processed in the wild. - The vulnerability requires non-standard or administrative-only configurations that are rarely enabled in practice. - **Context Multiplier (0.1 - 1.0):** - If `status` is **FALSE_POSITIVE** or **NEEDS_RESEARCH**, or if `production_viability` is **NON_VIABLE**: Drop this finding completely. Do not score it or update its file with calibration data. - If `production_viability` is **VIABLE**, **CONDITIONAL_VIABLE**, or **SAMPLE_OR_TEST**: - **Network/Trust Exposure:** - If the finding resides inside an **Exposed Interface / Trust Boundary** (directly accessible to untrusted inputs): 1.0. - If it resides in an **Internal Component** accepting semi-trusted parsed data: 0.8. - If deeply nested inside a **Privileged/Trusted Zone**: 0.5. - **Inference when Threat Model is Missing/Incomplete:** If `workspace/kb/THREAT_MODEL.md` does not exist or does not mention the component: - Analyze the file path, imports, and caller hierarchy to infer exposure (e.g., public APIs vs internal helpers). **Read only the pinned CODE_ROOT (Block A), never the live tree. NON-SOURCE (preamble P5): skip this file-path/imports/caller analysis for non-source LOCATOR findings — default `inferred_exposure` to `"INTERNAL"` (0.8) unless the finding or threat model declares otherwise.** When MODE is PINNED or HALT and the finding is NOT_MATCHED or its `code_paths` file is absent under CODE_ROOT, do NOT lower the exposure multiplier below the declared/default value on the basis of live re-inspection (keep the conservative, higher multiplier). - Default the Exposure Multiplier to **0.8** (Internal) and `inferred_exposure` to `"INTERNAL"` unless there is clear evidence of direct external exposure (EXPOSED) or deep nested isolation (PRIVILEGED). Local SUID/LPE binaries should default to `"INTERNAL"` exposure. - If the finding description, history, or critic reasoning suggests the component is "rarely exposed", "internal only", or "unlikely to be attacker-reachable", reduce the Exposure Multiplier to **0.5** or lower. - **Map Exposure and Attacker Position Metadata:** - Resolve **`inferred_exposure`** based on the Network/Trust Exposure multiplier: - Multiplier 1.0 (Exposed Interface) -> `"EXPOSED"` - Multiplier 0.8 (Internal Component) -> `"INTERNAL"` - Multiplier 0.5 (Privileged/Trusted Zone) -> `"PRIVILEGED"` - **Evaluate Attacker Position (declared in finding):** - Read `attacker_position` from the finding JSON. - **Determine by Barrier, Not Transport:** The `attacker_position` must represent the outermost boundary that the **first untrusted principal** (the ultimate human attacker or external threat actor) must cross to reach the interface. Do not key on the transport protocol (e.g., HTTP, gRPC, IPC) or the immediate protocol peer. - **Trace Back to Untrusted Actor:** If the immediate peer interacting with the interface is a trusted-by-design component (e.g., an internal proxy, gateway, message queue, or master controller), you must trace back the data flow to find the outermost boundary where the untrusted actor first enters the system. - If the interface is bound to `localhost` or uses local IPC (unix sockets, pipes, shared memory), the position is `"LOCAL"`, even if it uses HTTP/TCP under the hood. - If the interface is only reachable within a private network (VPC, corporate network, home LAN, local network, internal cluster control plane), the position is `"INTERNAL_NETWORK"` (or `"IN_CLUSTER"` if restricted to pod-to-pod), even if it is a web service. - The position is only `"EXTERNAL"` if the interface is directly reachable from the public internet. - If the interface requires physical contact, hardware interaction (e.g., JTAG, debug probes, chip decapping), or local wireless proximity (e.g., NFC, Bluetooth), the position must be `"PHYSICAL_TEMPORARY"` or `"PHYSICAL_LONG_TERM"`, regardless of the protocol used. - **Normalize Free-text:** If the value is present but is a free-text string that does not exactly match one of the valid enum values (e.g. legacy phrasings), you **MUST** normalize it to the closest valid enum using these mappings: - Phrases matching `"authenticated "`, `"customer with"`, `"tenant "`, `"Fitbit user"` on a public product -> `"EXTERNAL"` (with `privileges_required: "LOW"`). - Phrases matching `"local user"`, `"local shell"`, `"local access"` -> `"LOCAL"`. - Phrases matching `"peer in same job/cluster/pod"`, `"co-tenant"`, `"in-cluster (Kubernetes/container-orchestrator) workload"`, `"NCCL peer rank"` -> `"IN_CLUSTER"`. - Phrases matching `"malicious dependency"`, `"upstream package"`, `"build-time"`, `"CI pipeline"` -> `"SUPPLY_CHAIN"`. - Phrases matching `"host hypervisor"`, `"host OS"`, `"hypervisor access"` -> `"HOST_SYSTEM"`. - Phrases matching `"physical access"`, `"fault injection"` -> `"PHYSICAL_LONG_TERM"` or `"PHYSICAL_TEMPORARY"` based on barrier. - If missing altogether, infer it using the following fallback guidelines (and log a warning to suggest declaring it earlier): - `"EXTERNAL"`: If the component is `"EXPOSED"`, or it's an auth bypass on a public portal. - `"LOCAL"`: If it's a local privilege escalation (LPE) or SUID exploit. - `"IN_CLUSTER"`: If it targets in-cluster infrastructure (CSI/CNI) from a pod. - `"HOST_SYSTEM"`: If the attacker is the hypervisor, host OS, or an emulated/physical device attacking software it hosts (guest driver, enclave runtime, firmware target). This enum is strictly for the outer-to-inner direction. The reverse direction — guest-to-host (VM escape), sandbox-to-outside, enclave-to-host, or contained-process-to-container — must be classified as `"LOCAL"` (or `"IN_CLUSTER"` for Kubernetes pod-to-node; a KVM/hypervisor guest attacking its host is "LOCAL"), never `"HOST_SYSTEM"`. - `"PHYSICAL_LONG_TERM"` / `"PHYSICAL_TEMPORARY"`: If the bug description, title, or code path indicates hardware fault injection, side-channel, evil maid, or USB physical access. - `"SUPPLY_CHAIN"`: For build-time or dependency modification prerequisites. - `"INTERNAL_NETWORK"`: Default fallback for other internal components. - **Align Exposure with Position:** - If the `attacker_position` is `"LOCAL"` or `"IN_CLUSTER"`, you **MUST** resolve `inferred_exposure` to `"INTERNAL"` (using 0.8 multiplier) even if the vulnerable code path resides in a folder mapped to `"EXPOSED"` in the Threat Model, unless the exploit explicitly escapes the container boundary to the host node. - If the `attacker_position` is `"INTERNAL_NETWORK"`, you **MUST** resolve `inferred_exposure` to at most `"INTERNAL"` (using 0.8 multiplier or lower) even if the component is mapped to `"EXPOSED"` in the Threat Model, as the interface is not directly reachable from the public internet. - If the `attacker_position` is `"EXTERNAL"`, you **MUST** resolve `inferred_exposure` to `"EXPOSED"` (using 1.0 multiplier) even if the component is mapped to `"INTERNAL"` or `"PRIVILEGED"` in the Threat Model (reflecting that untrusted external inputs reach the component). - **Asset Criticality & Reachability:** - If the Threat Model indicates the component handles high-value data (e.g., PII, core secrets), keep the multiplier high. - If it affects a low-value target (e.g., internal analytics, sandboxed test data), reduce the multiplier (e.g., 0.5). - **Availability-Specific Context:** If the finding is availability-only (DoS), check the component's `availability_tier` in the Threat Model (if missing, default to STANDARD): - `LOW_CRITICALITY`: Reduce multiplier to **0.5**. - `STANDARD`: Reduce multiplier to **0.8**. - `CRITICAL`: Keep multiplier at **1.0**. - If static/dynamic analysis proves the vulnerable code is effectively "dead code" (never called in runtime execution paths), drastically reduce the multiplier to 0.2. **STALE-EVIDENCE GUARD (preamble P3–P4): do NOT apply this 0.2 reduction if the finding is STALE (MODE is PINNED or HALT AND the finding is NOT_MATCHED to the active snapshot, `code_paths` file is absent under the pinned CODE_ROOT) — drifted code can look "uncalled" spuriously; keep the higher multiplier and set `STALE_EVIDENCE` as the first token of `sanity_triage_applied`.** Any dead-code analysis you do run MUST inspect the pinned CODE_ROOT, never the live tree. **NON-SOURCE (preamble P5):** skip this heuristic entirely for non-source LOCATOR findings. - **User Interaction:** - If `user_interaction` is **REQUIRED** (e.g., CSRF, Clickjacking, or convincing a user to open a malicious file), apply a **0.7** multiplier to the Context Multiplier (e.g., if exposure is Internal (0.8) and user interaction is required, the combined multiplier is 0.8 * 0.7 = 0.56). This ensures these findings are capped below the CRITICAL threshold. - If `production_viability` is **SAMPLE_OR_TEST**: - Apply a **0.4** scaling factor to the Context Multiplier (i.e., multiply the current Context Multiplier by **0.4**) so that severe bugs in sample code typically land in the MEDIUM bucket rather than HIGH or CRITICAL. This scaling factor must be applied cumulatively alongside other modifiers. Do not override the Context Multiplier directly to `0.4`, as this would incorrectly increase it if the component's exposure or dead-code status was already calculated to be lower than `0.4` (e.g. `0.2`). - In the `executive_summary`, explicitly state that this is not a production bug. The recommendation MUST focus on fixing the example/test so that developers do not copy insecure patterns into production code. - If `production_viability` is **CONDITIONAL_VIABLE**: - Apply a **0.7** scaling factor to the Context Multiplier (i.e., multiply the current Context Multiplier by **0.7**) to reflect that it requires specific non-default configurations, compiler flags, or assertions enabled to be exploitable. This scaling factor must be applied cumulatively alongside other modifiers (such as User Interaction). Do not override the Context Multiplier directly to `0.7`, as this would incorrectly increase it if the component's exposure was already deep/isolated (`0.5`). - In the `executive_summary`, document the specific conditions required for viability. **Final Score (Hazard) = (Impact + Likelihood) * Multiplier** (Capped at 10.0). *Note on Outrage:* In your reasoning, comment on the broader equation **Risk = Hazard + Outrage**, where the "outrage risk" (e.g., reputational damage, user sentiment fallout) is taken into account. Do *not* include the outrage factor in the final numerical score. 3. **Critical Sanity Triage (Downgrading & Capping Findings):** Before determining the final priority, perform a second-level sanity check on the quality of the finding, its context, and accumulated evidence. **Core Principle - Marginal Capability:** The final severity and priority of a finding are strictly bounded by the *marginal capability* gained by the attacker over their prerequisite position. If the exploit does not grant the attacker significant new control, access, or capabilities beyond what is already inherent to their starting position (or already possessed via legitimate means), the finding must be capped or downgraded. The complete, detailed definitions of the 27 calibration sanity rules are stored in the reference catalogue at [Calibration Rules](https://skilld.dev/api/skills-raw/google/mantis/mantis-calibrate/references/calibration_rules.md). You MUST evaluate each finding against the 27 rules listed there. Check if the `THREAT_MODEL.md` defines any `Calibration Overrides` (e.g., `LIFT_CAP: PHYSICAL_LONG_TERM`). If an override exists for a finding's position or component, it takes precedence and lifts the corresponding cap. Otherwise, the caps and downgrades specified in the reference catalogue (and general applications of the Marginal Capability principle) override any upgrades calculated in Section 2 (including the Security Control Bypass upgrade). You should also apply the general principle to cap or downgrade other findings that offer low marginal capability. **Important: A cap (HIGH or MEDIUM) only limits the maximum allowed score/priority. It must NOT upgrade a lower score/priority (e.g., a finding with a score of 5.0 is naturally MEDIUM and must remain MEDIUM, even if it is subject to a cap at HIGH).** **Precedence & UNKNOWN Rules Policy:** - **STALE-EVIDENCE precedence (preamble P3–P4):** when MODE is PINNED or HALT and a finding is STALE (NOT_MATCHED to the active snapshot, OR its `code_paths` file is absent under the pinned CODE_ROOT), the following rules MUST NOT be used to lower or inflate the score from live re-inspection: `repro_failure` (do not force-LOW), `vague_code_paths` (do not force-LOW), and the `static_confirmation` **trace-lift exception** (do not treat a stale trace/sanitizer/crash-log as live reproduction — KEEP the static HIGH cap). Also do not apply the Section 2 dead-code 0.2 multiplier (see Section 2). Keep the conservative score and **prepend the literal token `STALE_EVIDENCE` as the FIRST token of `sanity_triage_applied`** (before any `Incomplete Calibration (UNKNOWN: …)` warnings and before the fired-rule list). Record the guarded rules in `calibration_checklist` as specified in preamble P4 (`repro_failure`/`vague_code_paths` -> `UNKNOWN` with a `STALE_EVIDENCE:` reason; `static_confirmation` -> `APPLIES` with a `STALE_EVIDENCE:` reason noting the trace-lift was suppressed). In MODE == MODE-OFF, this bullet does nothing (score as today). - Evaluate ALL rules. If multiple caps apply, the **most restrictive** wins (Force-LOW > cap-MEDIUM > cap-HIGH). - **Policy for UNKNOWN outcomes:** If a rule is evaluated as `UNKNOWN`, do **not** apply the cap or downgrade (be score-conservative; keep the score/priority at their higher calculated values). However, mark the overall calibration as incomplete/provisional by prepending a warning to the `"sanity_triage_applied"` string: `"Incomplete Calibration (UNKNOWN: )"` (or a semicolon-separated list of warnings if there are multiple UNKNOWNs). This signals that manual review is required to resolve the rule status. - Record every rule that successfully fired/applied in `sanity_triage_applied` as a semicolon-separated list, most restrictive first (e.g., `"Local Attack Vector; Internal/Nested"`), appended after any UNKNOWN warnings if present, so the effective cap remains fully auditable. 4. **Determine Priority:** - **CRITICAL (8.0 - 10.0):** Immediate action required. Very high hazard (e.g. high impact and likelihood). **Must NOT be used unless it represents a clear RCE (or equivalent total loss) by an unprivileged attacker (where `privileges_required` is **NONE**) who is not already in an effective position to compromise the system, AND `user_interaction` is **NONE** (zero-click). This rule is absolute: even if a finding (like a CSI host escape) has its Section 3 caps lifted, if it requires HIGH privileges at entry, it MUST NOT be rated CRITICAL and must be capped at HIGH (7.9). Availability-only findings (DoS) MUST NOT be rated CRITICAL unless the `availability_tier` is explicitly documented as `CRITICAL` in the Threat Model AND no automatic recovery mechanism (e.g. auto-restart, load balancer failover) mitigates the impact.** - **HIGH (6.0 - 7.9):** High priority. Significant hazard, needs prompt resolution. - **MEDIUM (3.0 - 5.9):** Standard priority. Moderate hazard, can be scheduled. - **LOW (0.1 - 2.9):** Low priority. Minimal hazard. **Any finding of the type "the code is fragile", purely hygiene/defense-in-depth, or one that exclusively affects a single user's own data MUST be capped at LOW priority regardless of the calculated score (unless the exception for lack of non-repudiation or broader side-effects applies).** 5. **Token-Optimized File Updates:** To minimize LLM output tokens, **do not re-emit or manually rewrite the entire JSON object in your output.** Instead, write a reusable helper script (e.g., `workspace/helpers/append_calibrate.py`) during your first finding update. For all subsequent findings, do not regenerate the script; simply execute the existing helper script with the new parameters to append the required fields to `workspace/findings/.json`. - **Helper version marker (mandatory).** The very first line of `append_calibrate.py` MUST be the exact comment `# MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2`. Before reusing an existing helper, read its first line: if the file is absent, OR the first line is not exactly `# MANTIS_HELPER_VERSION = 2` (marker missing or a different integer), **regenerate the helper from scratch** (an older helper silently drops the new `snapshot` history field and the `STALE_EVIDENCE` handling). The regenerated helper MUST be able to write the `snapshot` key into the appended `history` entry and to prepend `STALE_EVIDENCE` to `sanity_triage_applied`. The helper is STATE-RELATIVE (`workspace/helpers/…`, Block A step 3) — never write it under CODE_ROOT. Alongside the existing core finding data, explicitly append the following fields to show the matrix breakdown: - `"impact_score"` (1-5) - `"likelihood_score"` (1-5) - `"availability_tier"` (CRITICAL, STANDARD, LOW_CRITICALITY or null) - `"inferred_exposure"` (EXPOSED, INTERNAL, or PRIVILEGED) - `"attacker_position"` (preserved from input, or populated from fallback inference if missing) - `"mantis_risk_score"` (the final Hazard score) - `"priority"` (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW) - `"sanity_triage_applied"` (semicolon-separated list, or null). Ordering: `STALE_EVIDENCE` first if the finding was STALE (preamble P4); then any `Incomplete Calibration (UNKNOWN: )` warnings; then the Section 3 rules that fired, most-restrictive first. Example: `"STALE_EVIDENCE; Incomplete Calibration (UNKNOWN: physical_long_term); Local Attack Vector"`. - `"calibration_checklist"` object containing evaluations for all 27 sanity caps. Each key in the object maps to the sanity cap rule of the matching name: ```json { "repro_failure": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "unreachable_inputs": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "third_party_reachability": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "minor_config_hygiene": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "non_security_critical": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "vague_code_paths": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "unreliable_triggers": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "prerequisite_shell": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "physical_long_term": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "trusted_controller_zero_delta": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "standard_host_attacks": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "static_confirmation": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "strict_xss": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "internal_nested": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "probabilistic_llm": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "supply_chain_prerequisites": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "non_default_config": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "confidential_computing_host": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "trusted_controller_critical_bypass": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "local_attack_vector": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "self_contained_blast": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "rarely_exposed": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "equivalent_primitives": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "documented_insecure_config": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "physical_temporary": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "high_privilege_external": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" }, "trusted_controller_standard_bypass": { "outcome": "APPLIES" | "DOES_NOT_APPLY" | "UNKNOWN", "reason": "" } } ``` For each rule, `outcome` must be set to: - `"APPLIES"`: if the sanity cap rule applies (fires) to this finding, capping or downgrading its score/priority. A detailed `reason` string is **required**. - `"DOES_NOT_APPLY"`: if the sanity cap rule does not apply. The `reason` field is **optional** and may be omitted to optimize tokens. - `"UNKNOWN"`: if it is unresolved. A detailed `reason` string is **required**. For backward compatibility, the schema also permits `"fires": ` (with `reason` required only if `fires` is `true`), but the new `"outcome"` format is preferred. - `"outrage_commentary"` (your reasoning about the outrage factor) - `"executive_summary"` - An entry to the `"history"` array: ```json { "stage": "calibrate", "action": "calibrated", "details": "Calculated risk score as [score] and priority as [priority].[ STALE_EVIDENCE: scored without trusting live-code re-inspection.]", "pass_number": , "snapshot": "", "timestamp": "" } ``` Save your updates to the individual finding files. When complete, notify the user.