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Threat-models a change that crosses a trust boundary, turns each abuse case into a failing test, triages a scanner or advisory finding, and writes a design review into the design doc. Use when adding or changing auth, login, sessions, cookies, passwords, tokens, JWT, permissions, roles, user input, file uploads, webhooks, a fetch of a user-supplied URL, secrets, API keys, CORS, CSRF, XSS, SQL injection, a vulnerability, a CVE, a dependency or npm audit finding, a threat model, personal data, PII, GDPR, or an LLM feature that handles untrusted text, or when the user asks whether something is secure. Not for reviewing a whole diff - use `review`; not for Go-specific APIs - use go; not for SQL or schema design - use database.

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Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/avik-creator/agent-skills/security

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referencesthreat-model.md

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Threat model

Read when starting a feature that crosses a trust boundary, when placing a finding on the risk grid, or when writing the security section of a design doc.

Boundaries and assets

A trust boundary is a place untrusted data enters code you run. Count a request, a form field, an upload, a webhook, a third-party response, a queue message, model output, another process's command line or environment, a filename on a shared volume, and a path inside a job payload. A value is not trusted because the operating system handed it to you.

Name the assets someone would steal or break: credentials, personal data, payment data, admin actions, money movement.

STRIDE per interaction

Start from the letters in the row, and add one when it fits this system. Spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege.

From To Letters Ask
External Process S, T, R, I, D, E Can the caller pretend to be someone else, alter the payload, deny sending it, read it on the way, flood the process, or come out with more rights?
Process Datastore T, R, I, D Can the process alter stored data, deny a write, read data it should not, or fill the store?
Process Outbound call T, I, D Can the caller choose where the server connects (SSRF), can the reply be altered or read on the way, can a slow or huge reply stall the process?
Process Process S, T, I, D, E Can one process pretend to be another, alter what it sends, leak data across, overwhelm the other, or gain the other's rights?

The rows are a starting point, not a rule. A letter left out still needs a look when the system gives it a reason, such as repudiation between two services that act for different users.

Abuse cases

For each feature, write how you would misuse it, two to five cases. Each case names the caller, the input, and the bad outcome. Each case becomes a test that fails before the fix exists.

A shape check is not an abuse case. "The path must be absolute" does not show that a delete stays inside the allowed root.

Impact × likelihood

Use three levels for each: low, medium, high. Say the cell in words ("high impact, low likelihood"). Do not turn the cell into a score.

Propose a fix first for a finding that is high on both. Anything you defer, including a high finding you cannot reach or cannot patch yet, gets a reason and a review date. The user decides the order.

Control types

Tag every control you keep:

  • Preventive stops the action. An ownership check, a parameterized query.
  • Detective shows that it happened. An audit event for a denied login.
  • Corrective limits the damage after. Rotating a secret that leaked, disabling a session.

If a threat has a preventive control and nothing that would show or limit a failure of that control, write the residual risk.

Residual risk

One or two sentences: what you did not close, who accepts it, and when it is reviewed. "None" is allowed when you can point at the test that fails if the abuse works.

Design-review section

Discuss the section with the user, then add it to the design doc through the design-docs skill. Omit a heading that would not change a decision.

## Security
Boundaries: <who writes each value that crosses in>
Assets: <what is worth stealing or breaking>
STRIDE: <interaction, letters, control>
Abuse cases: <case, and the test that fails first>
Controls: <name, preventive | detective | corrective>
Residual risk: <what remains, who accepts it, review date>
Open: <questions for the owner, including which regulations may apply>

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

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Signed by skilld at a0324a3. This ties the file your Agent reads to that commit on GitHub. It does not review the instructions.

Last checked against GitHub 4 days ago.

Activeupdated 3 weeks ago

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