/ios-qa

Tailscale ACL example for the iOS QA daemon

The Mac-side daemon binds the Tailscale interface only when you pass --tailnet. By default the daemon is local-USB-only. This doc walks through the steps to expose your iPhone to remote agents safely so they can run iOS QA over the tailnet.

Threat model recap

• iOS app StateServer: loopback-only always. Reachable from the Mac via the CoreDevice IPv6 tunnel. Never directly bound to tailnet.
• Mac daemon: owns the tailnet interface. Binds two listeners — loopback (full surface, never forwarded) and tailnet (locked allowlist with capability tiers).
• Auth: Tailscale identity validation via the local tailscaled socket (/var/run/tailscale.sock LocalAPI WhoIs). Allowlist file at ~/.gstack/ios-qa-allowlist.json is the single source of truth for who can do what.

Step 1: Install and run Tailscale

brew install --cask tailscale
# Login + start tailscaled, then verify:
tailscale status

Confirm the daemon can read the LocalAPI socket:

test -S /var/run/tailscale.sock && echo "socket present" || echo "MISSING"

If missing, the daemon will refuse to open the tailnet listener (fail-closed).

Step 2: Set up the daemon's ACL

The daemon needs to know which Tailscale identities are allowed to control which devices at which capability tier. The allowlist file is JSON:

{
  "version": 1,
  "entries": [
    {
      "identity": "you@example.com",
      "capabilities": ["restore"],
      "expires_at": null,
      "note": "Owner — full access"
    },
    {
      "identity": "ci@example.com",
      "capabilities": ["mutate"],
      "expires_at": "2026-12-31T00:00:00Z",
      "note": "CI runner — can write state but not full restore"
    },
    {
      "identity": "tag:claude-readonly",
      "capabilities": ["observe"],
      "expires_at": null,
      "note": "Agents that should only read"
    }
  ]
}

Identities are canonicalized via WhoIs:

• User OAuth: user@example.com (no acct:, no domain rewriting).
• Tagged nodes: tag:<tagname> (lowercased).
• Node keys: node:<nodekey-hex> (rare; use tags instead).

Capability tiers are ordered: observe < interact < mutate < restore. Granting restore implies all lower tiers.

Step 3: Mint a session token for a remote agent

You can let agents self-mint (if their identity is allowlisted) or you can mint server-side for them:

# Server-side mint (owner-only, runs locally on the Mac with the device):
gstack-ios-qa-mint --remote ci@example.com --capability mutate --ttl 1h

# Self-service mint (agent over tailnet):
curl -X POST http://<mac-tailnet-ip>:9999/auth/mint \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"capability": "interact"}'
# → {"session_token": "...", "expires_at": "...", "capability": "interact"}

Step 4: Tighten the Tailscale ACL (defense in depth)

The daemon's allowlist is the primary access control. Belt-and-suspenders: restrict the tailnet ACL to limit who can even reach the daemon port.

// In your tailscale admin console:
{
  "acls": [
    // Allow CI runner to reach the iOS QA Mac on port 9999 only.
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["ci@example.com"],
      "dst": ["ios-qa-mac:9999"]
    },
    // Tagged Claude agents — observe tier only (enforced by daemon, not ACL).
    {
      "action": "accept",
      "src": ["tag:claude-readonly"],
      "dst": ["ios-qa-mac:9999"]
    },
    // Default deny.
    {
      "action": "drop",
      "src": ["*"],
      "dst": ["ios-qa-mac:9999"]
    }
  ]
}

Step 5: Audit trail

Every authenticated mutating request through the tailnet listener writes a row to ~/.gstack/security/ios-qa-audit.jsonl:

{"ts":"2026-05-18T14:23:00Z","identity":"ci@example.com","device_udid":"00008101-XXXX","endpoint":"/tap","session_id":"abc...","capability":"interact","request_id":"req_001","status":200}

Rejections (no token, expired token, capability-insufficient, identity not allowlisted, rate limit hit) write to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl.

Rate limits

• /auth/mint: 10 mints / 60s per identity. 11th returns 429.
• Per-tailnet-request body: 1MB hard cap (413 above).
• Screenshot response: 10MB hard cap (500 above with sanitized error).

Token lifetime

• Daemon-minted session tokens: default 1h TTL, max 24h via --tailnet-session-ttl.
• Refreshable via POST /session/heartbeat (extends by ttl_seconds, capped at the original max).
• Boot token (between iOS app launch and daemon rotation): ~5s lifetime — daemon rotates immediately on first scrape.

Failure modes