Index of every page on this site: llms.txt
All skills
jeremylongshore avatar

/adobe-security-basics

@820dfc8
Run it yourself

Establish least privilege, credential rotation, webhook authenticity, signed-URL custody, log minimization, and destructive-action controls. Use when designing or hardening Adobe integrations. Trigger with "secure Adobe integration", "rotate Adobe secret", or "verify Adobe webhook".

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/adobe-security-basics

Nothing lands on disk. Nothing to clean up.

Fork this Skill

Edit a local copy. It keeps the author and licence.

SKILL.md

≈77 tokens for metadata: the name and description. ≈873 when used: this file. ≈814 more on demand in 1 file.

Description uses 3.8% of example budget

Before choosing a Skill, your Agent reads its name and description. All available Skills share that space.

  • A shorter description leaves more room for other Skills. This entry exceeds our 1% size suggestion.

In our Claude Code example, all Skill names and descriptions share 8,000 characters. This Skill uses ≈307 characters, or 3.8%.

The 1% threshold is a size suggestion. Longer descriptions can still fit.

Your model, settings, and other Skills decide how much text your Agent can read.

Example settings and source

The example uses a 200k-token context and default Claude Code settings. The count includes the name, description, separators, and when_to_use when present. Codex also counts local file paths.

Skit's source and limits: Codex 0.160.1, Claude Code 2.1.292.

Adobe Integration Security Baseline

Overview

Establish least privilege, credential rotation, webhook authenticity, signed-URL custody, log minimization, and destructive-action controls. This workflow produces a reviewable artifact and evidence before any live side effect.

Prerequisites

  • Current first-party Adobe documentation for every selected service, API version, auth flow, limit, and lifecycle.
  • Named product, identity, security, data, budget, release, and operations owners appropriate to the scope.
  • Synthetic or approved non-production fixtures with secret and content canaries.

Current Contract

Effective authority combines credential type, organization/project/workspace, scopes, product profiles, service entitlement, resource ownership, and operation. Event authenticity requires recipient and signature validation or mTLS; a syntactically valid JSON body is not trusted. Recheck the dated evidence map before relying on mutable product behavior.

Authentication

Store secrets server-side, redact signed URLs as bearer capabilities, rotate by overlap-and-verify, and delete the old secret only after last-use evidence proves cutover.

Instructions

  1. Inventory credentials, users, scopes, profiles, projects, workspaces, webhooks, storage URLs, logs, and data flows.
  2. Map effective read/write/generate/deploy/admin authority and remove stale or duplicate grants.
  3. Add server-side secret storage, rotation alarms, host allowlists, request schemas, and structured redaction.
  4. Validate webhook recipientclientid and digital signature/public-key host, or document the approved mTLS alternative.
  5. Test credential theft, wrong organization, cross-environment swap, replay, forged key URL, and log canaries.
  6. Assign recertification, rotation, incident, retention, deletion, and exception owners.

Tool Discipline

Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect current documentation, configuration, code, fixtures, and evidence. Use Write and Edit only for approved repository artifacts. Skill invocation alone does not authorize network access, credentials, Adobe content, consent, uploads, generation, spend, deployment, registration changes, replay, cancellation, or deletion.

Approval Boundaries

Security and organization owners approve credentials, scopes, product profiles, webhooks, and secret deletion. Data owners approve uploads, generated outputs, retention, sharing, and asset deletion.

Error Handling

  • Never fetch a verification key from an arbitrary event-supplied host.
  • Never rotate by deleting the only working secret first.
  • Never log Authorization headers, refresh tokens, signed URLs, prompts, or document content.

Output

Return threat model, access matrix, rotation plan, webhook/storage controls, test evidence, findings, owners, and recertification date. Mark assumptions, observed environment behavior, owners, evidence dates, and unresolved gaps explicitly.

Examples

  • Reject a webhook whose recipient client ID differs.
  • Rotate a sandbox secret with overlap and last-used verification.

Validation

Exercise and record expected and observed results for:

  • wrong organization
  • stale secret
  • forged webhook
  • replay
  • signed URL leak
  • destructive approval

Resources

  • Current first-party evidence map — recheck dated Adobe sources before execution.
  • Treat observed tenant or product behavior as environment-specific evidence, never a universal Adobe guarantee.

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

No rule matched.

skilld matched fixed text patterns in SKILL.md and file names. Patterns miss obfuscated code.

skilld run checks every file with the same patterns. It asks for approval before it loads a Skill with a behavior marked Needs approval.

No alerts2mo3 checks · Risk SAFE
  • Gen Agent Trust Hub2mo

    This skill provides security guidelines and best practices for hardening Adobe integrations. It contains no executable code, external dependencies, or malicious instructions.

  • Socket2mo

    No alerts

  • Snyk2mo

    Risk: LOW · No issues

Signed by skilld at 820dfc8. This ties the file your Agent reads to that commit on GitHub. It does not review the instructions.

Last checked against GitHub yesterday.

Activeupdated 2 months ago
What it can do
Reads files Edits files
Modelinherit
argument-hint
<application> <services> <data-classification>
version
1.8.0
author
Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
All 5 allowed tools
ReadGlobGrepWriteEdit
Other metadata
tags
[
  "saas",
  "adobe",
  "security"
]
model
inherit
effort
high
compatibility
Designed for Claude Code; live Adobe actions require network access, appropriate entitlement and authentication, and explicit approval

README badge

README badge for jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/adobe-security-basics