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/validating-authentication-implementations

@820dfc8
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Review authentication declarations and verify explicit local JWT trust profiles. Use when reviewing login systems or auth flows. Trigger with 'validate authentication', 'check auth security', or 'review login'.

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/validating-authentication-implementations

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Edit a local copy. It keeps the author and licence.

scriptsREADME.md

≈1.5k tokens on demand. Your agent reads this file only when SKILL.md points to it.

Local CLI and input contracts

Use Python 3.11+ for the tested full verification environment. These scripts do not install anything or call providers. Optional verification dependencies are in requirements.txt; installation is a separate operator choice. JSON/keys/candidates are local inputs, not executable configuration.

Common behavior

Reports are one JSON document on stdout, or an atomic private 0600 --output replacement. Symlink destinations and aliases of selected input files fail. Preserve exit status; the report being written is not a passing verdict. Unknown fields/methods, duplicate JSON members, wrong types and non-finite numbers fail. File inputs are bounded to 1 MiB, JWTs and key files to 256 KiB. This is bounded local I/O, not an OS sandbox. Native input/error values are omitted from diagnostics; private files and environment still need protection.

--verbose remains accepted for compatibility and does not enable raw-secret logging. There is no automated --code, --scan, live URL or account workflow.

Authentication declarations

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/authentication_check.py" --config auth.json --output auth-report.json

Inputs select exactly one method: jwt, oauth, session or api_key, with its matching object. See auth_schema.py for the accepted fields and types. Optional password_policy, mfa and account_lockout declarations are checked if supplied; missing optional sections are listed as unassessed. No result verifies runtime.

Minimal declared JWT profile, not proof of deployed JWT verification:

{
  "method": "jwt",
  "jwt": {
    "algorithm": "HS256",
    "expiration_seconds": 600,
    "issuer": "https://issuer.example.invalid",
    "audience": "example-app"
  }
}

OAuth requires client_type public or confidential. The supported confidential profile uses a supplied client_secret; other client-authentication methods need separate review. Public clients do not require a confidential secret. Supply redirect_uris, scopes, pkce_enabled and pkce_method S256. These are declared HTTPS web-client checks, not native-app validation or server matching tests.

0 means no automated flags for supplied declarations; 1 findings/review; 2 incomplete/usage. runtime_verified is always false.

JWT inspection and verification

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/jwt_analyzer.py" --file token.jwt
python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/jwt_analyzer.py" --file token.jwt --key trusted.pem --algorithm RS256 --issuer https://issuer.example.invalid --audience example-app --output verification.json

Exactly one --file or legacy --token input. Prefer a private file to keep bearer values out of process arguments/history. Complete verification needs --key (local file), --algorithm (one explicit supported value), --issuer and --audience. --validate remains accepted and never permits a missing profile to pass. Otherwise well-formed inspection without all trust/profile inputs returns 2; malformed/invalid inputs may return 1. The valid field is never true without verification.

Supported algorithms: HS256/384/512, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, ES256/384/512. PyJWT >=2.15.1,<3 is required at runtime; use the tested pinned requirements. HMAC keys must meet the selected hash-size byte minimum; RSA keys must be at least 2048 bits, EC curves must match the selected algorithm. These checks do not establish entropy or trust. Expiration is required; exp/nbf/iat must be finite NumericDate values. Issuer/audience expectations are not read from the token. Clock leeway is zero. Unsupported critical/unencoded-payload semantics fail.

No header-supplied key, JWK/JWKS fetch, revocation check, replay database or issuer ownership verification. Reports show controlled metadata, not raw payloads, signatures or kid values. 0 verified for this explicit profile; 1 invalid under selected checks; 2 unverified/incomplete/usage.

Password policy and candidates

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/password_policy_check.py" --policy policy.json
python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/password_policy_check.py" --policy policy.json --password-file candidate.txt --output candidate-report.json

--config and --policy are exclusive aliases. Candidate sources are exclusive: legacy --test/--test-password, --password-file, or --password-stdin. File/stdin contents are exact UTF-8; a trailing newline remains part of the candidate. The candidate and matched blocklist value are never printed.

Example declared policy for the supported local review (not a deployment claim):

{
  "minimum_length": 15,
  "maximum_length": 128,
  "hashing": { "algorithm": "pbkdf2", "iterations": 600000 },
  "account_lockout": { "enabled": true, "max_attempts": 5 },
  "rejected_patterns": ["fictional-blocked-value"]
}

Default authentication_context is single-factor; explicitly declared mfa selects its separate length profile without proving MFA. Required composition and periodic-expiration declarations generate review flags rather than being mandatory defaults. The legacy rejected_patterns list is exact values, never regex or substring matching. Its adequacy/coverage is not assessed. Requested history checking is incomplete without historical data; no strength score is computed (score null). Hashing and throttling are declaration review only.

KDF metadata: pbkdf2 defaults to sha256 (600000 iterations); explicit sha512 uses 220000. Argon2id supports p=1 with memory/time profiles 47104/1, 19456/2, 12288/3, 9216/4 or 7168/5 (memory in KiB). Legacy bcrypt reviews cost>=10 and its 72-byte limit. Other variants/parameters require review, not a compatibility verdict.

0 selected local checks pass without policy flags; 1 failures/review; 2 incomplete/usage. A candidate result is not an authentication decision.

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

skilld matched fixed text patterns in SKILL.md and file names. Patterns miss obfuscated code.

skilld run checks every file with the same patterns. It asks for approval before it loads a Skill with a behavior marked Needs approval.

No alerts2mo3 checks · Risk SAFE
  • Gen Agent Trust Hub2mo

    The skill is a security auditing tool for validating authentication implementations. It uses local scripts to analyze configuration files and code for weaknesses. No malicious patterns or security risks were identified.

  • Socket2mo

    No alerts

  • Snyk2mo

    Risk: LOW · No issues

Signed by skilld at 820dfc8. This ties the file your Agent reads to that commit on GitHub. It does not review the instructions.

Last checked against GitHub yesterday.

Activeupdated 4 weeks ago
What it can do
Reads files Runs commands
version
1.28.0
author
Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
tags
[
  "security",
  "authentication",
  "compliance"
]
All 6 allowed tools
ReadGrepGlobBash(security:*)Bash(scan:*)Bash(audit:*)
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