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/printing-press-amend

@9e1a8d4
Run it yourself

Amend a published CLI from one of two input sources: (1) dogfood mode mines the active Claude Code session transcript for friction (missing flags, hand- rolled API payloads, silent-null returns); (2) direct-input mode accepts user-supplied asks (rename a command, add commands or feeds, fix a named bug, optionally sniff the source site for new endpoints). Confirms scope with the user, plans + executes the fix autonomously, scrubs PII, and opens a PR against mvanhorn/printing-press-library. Two user-in-loop checkpoints: scope after capture, PR draft before open. Trigger phrases: "amend the CLI", "submit a patch", "fix what I just dogfooded", "open a PR for this CLI", "patch this CLI", "add features to my CLI", "rename this command", "add these feeds to <cli>", "sniff for new APIs in <cli>", "amend with these ideas", "use printing-press-amend", "run printing-press-amend".

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/mvanhorn/cli-printing-press/printing-press-amend

Nothing lands on disk. Nothing to clean up.

Fork this Skill

Edit a local copy. It keeps the author and licence.

referencespii-scrubbing.md

≈1.5k tokens on demand. Your agent reads this file only when SKILL.md points to it.

PII Scrubbing for /printing-press-amend

This reference is loaded by Phase 5. The scrub mechanism has two layers — credentials (regex patterns, reused from /printing-press-retro) and entities (user-maintained stop-list, specific to amend).

The scrub operates on temp staging copies of the artifacts that will leave the local machine — never on the user's original session transcript or the in-progress source code in the managed clone. Source code in $CLI_DIR is presumed PII-free by the agent's own restraint (the agent should never have introduced PII into Go source); this is verified as a defense-in-depth check, not as a primary control.

What gets scrubbed

In priority order (highest leak risk first):

  1. The PR title and body draft (composed in Phase 6, scrubbed before display in Phase 6's checkpoint)
  2. The per-run plan doc body at $PRESS_MANUSCRIPTS/<slug>/<run-id>/proofs/<timestamp>-amend-<cli-name>.md — this is the artifact reviewers may follow links to from the PR body's Evidence section
  3. The deferred-findings list at $PRESS_MANUSCRIPTS/<slug>/<run-id>/proofs/<timestamp>-amend-<cli-name>-deferred.md — same audience
  4. Any test fixtures or example outputs newly added to $CLI_DIR (defense-in-depth — the agent should not have added PII here, but verify)

For each target, copy to <path>.pre-pii-scrub BEFORE scrubbing so the user can audit what changed.

Layer 1: Credentials (reuse retro patterns)

Run the credential-pattern scan from skills/printing-press-retro/references/secret-scrubbing.md — it covers Stripe keys, GitHub PATs/OAuth, bearer tokens, generic API keys, AWS access keys, etc. Point at the same regex set; do not duplicate the patterns here so both skills evolve together.

For Phase 5's purposes, the credential scan's redaction tags (<REDACTED:bearer-token>, etc.) become the shape-preserving tokens for credential entities. Same surface, same tag.

Critical addition for amend that retro's patterns don't cover by default:

  • Authorization: Bearer ... headers in hand-rolled API payloads quoted from the session transcript. Retro's bearer-token pattern catches the value but only when the prefix is exactly Bearer — verify amend's evidence quotes also normalize to that shape, OR add a broader Authorization: <scheme> <opaque> regex specific to amend.
  • Cookie: ... headers from session-replay payloads. These often contain session IDs that uniquely identify the user even if not technically secret.
  • X-API-Key: and similar header-based auth shapes.

Layer 2: Entities (companies, persons, custom stop-list)

Read the user's stop-list at ~/.printing-press/amend-config.yaml. If the file doesn't exist, create a default with a starter list and a comment explaining the format:

# ~/.printing-press/amend-config.yaml
# User-maintained stop-list for /printing-press-amend's PII scrub.
# Add company and person names that should be replaced with shape-preserving
# tokens before any artifact leaves the local machine.

stoplist:
  companies:
    # - "Esper Labs"
    # - "Acme Corp"
  people:
    # - "Matt Van Horn"
    # - "Trevin Chow"
  emails:
    # Domain-level scrubbing — any email at this domain becomes <email-N>
    # - "esperlabs.ai"
    # - "company.com"

# Behavior knobs
behavior:
  # When true, also flag capitalized non-stop-listed strings for user review
  # before the PR draft is shown (defense against first-mention leaks).
  prompt_unrecognized_capitalized: true

When the file exists, read it. Validate file mode (warn if world-writable; abort if owned by another user — symlink attack surface).

For each artifact, replace stop-listed values with shape-preserving tokens:

Original shape Token
Company name <company-1>, <company-2>, ...
Person name <person-1>, <person-2>, ...
Email address <email-1>, <email-2>, ...

Same source value gets the same token across the run; distinct sources get distinct tokens. Track the mapping in a per-run scrub report (NOT committed; written to $PRESS_MANUSCRIPTS/<slug>/<run-id>/scrub-report.json for the user's audit).

Layer 3: Defense against first-mention leaks

The stop-list is by definition incomplete on first encounter with a new entity. To catch this:

  1. After Layers 1+2, walk each artifact again and find capitalized multi-word phrases that look like proper nouns (e.g. matches \b[A-Z][a-z]+ [A-Z][a-z]+\b) and were NOT replaced by Layer 2.

  2. Filter out a known-safe allowlist (GitHub, Slack, Linear, Claude, Anthropic, common HTTP-shape words, the API/CLI vendor name, etc.).

  3. Surface remaining candidates inline before the Phase 6 PR-draft display:

    "Found unrecognized capitalized phrase: Esper Labs (appears 3 times in plan doc, 1 time in PR body draft). Add to stop-list and scrub, or accept as legitimate?"

    Options: scrub (add to stop-list), accept (don't scrub), show context (display surrounding lines).

This isn't perfect — uncapitalized PII (lowercase email handles, internal codenames) still slips through — but it catches the most common failure mode without forcing the user to maintain an exhaustive stop-list.

Defense-in-depth: Go source check

Walk every *.go file in $CLI_DIR and scan for stop-list matches. If any match is found, treat as a hard error:

"BLOCKING: PII pattern matched Go source at <file>:<line>. The skill should not have introduced PII into Go source — please review the diff in $CLI_DIR/<file> and resolve before continuing. The patch will not proceed to Phase 6 until this clears."

Do NOT auto-modify Go source. Pause and require user resolution.

Output

Phase 5 emits to Phase 6:

scrub_report_path: $PRESS_MANUSCRIPTS/<slug>/<run-id>/scrub-report.json
artifacts_scrubbed:
  - path: <plan-doc-path>
    tokens_replaced: 7
    backup: <plan-doc-path>.pre-pii-scrub
  - ...
unrecognized_phrases: []           # may be present if user accepted some
go_source_check: clean             # or [list of blocking matches]

If go_source_check is non-empty, Phase 6 cannot proceed.

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

skilld matched fixed text patterns in SKILL.md and file names. Patterns miss obfuscated code.

skilld run checks every file with the same patterns. It asks for approval before it loads a Skill with a behavior marked Needs approval.

1 warning8d3 checks · Risk SAFE
  • Gen Agent Trust Hub9d

    The skill is generally safe but possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and processes Claude Code session transcripts, which contain untrusted data from past interactions. It also accesses sensitive local session history and performs automated code modifications and GitHub pull request operations.

  • Socket8d

    No alerts

  • Snyk9d

    Risk: MEDIUM · 2 issues

Signed by skilld at 9e1a8d4. This ties the file your Agent reads to that commit on GitHub. It does not review the instructions.

Last checked against GitHub 19 hours ago.

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