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Assess an immutable patch artifact's program impact, regression risk, and auto-merge eligibility. Use for generated patch files, provider pull-request diffs, or commit ranges when reviewers need evidence about affected runtime paths, contracts, tests, and recoverability. This skill is read-only and does not generate, edit, apply, push, or merge the patch.

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/openai/codex-security/assess-patch-risk

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referencesrisk-rubric.md

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Patch risk rubric

Rate each dimension from evidence, not from diff size or test count.

Impact if wrong

  • low: local behavior with no material contract, state, privilege, availability, deployment, or shared-runtime effect.
  • moderate: bounded component or consumer impact with a clear containment boundary.
  • high: shared runtime, public contract, persistent state, privileged boundary, broad deployment, or difficult operational recovery.
  • critical: plausible cross-tenant, major security, irreversible state, fleet-wide, or catastrophic availability impact.

Regression likelihood

  • low: narrow semantics, supported controls preserved, material counterexamples rejected, and directly relevant protection passes.
  • moderate: some coupling, partial protection, or bounded uncertainty remains but no source-visible defect is established.
  • high: complex or weakly protected behavior, important untested paths, contract ambiguity, or substantial unresolved coupling.
  • critical: evidence already demonstrates a serious regression, bypass, unsupported control break, or failed required safety property.

Regression protection

  • strong: assertions observe the changed property through affected callers or integration boundaries, relevant checks ran at the assessed head, and required platform or rollout validation is present.
  • partial: useful tests exist but miss an affected caller, failure mode, platform, deployment, or integration boundary.
  • none: no relevant executable protection was found or the available checks did not run.
  • unknown: test identity, execution, or relevance cannot be established.

Recoverability

  • easy: isolated revert or disable path with no migration, persisted incompatible state, or coordinated rollout.
  • managed: recovery is understood but needs coordination, replay, cleanup, or operational action.
  • hard: rollback is unsafe, irreversible, stateful, cross-version, or operationally uncertain.

Confidence

  • high: exact patch identity, affected roots and callers, material boundaries, controls, counterexamples, and relevant validation are all evidenced.
  • moderate: the main path is traced but a bounded non-decision-critical gap remains.
  • low: patch identity, applicability, runtime reachability, contract, or a decision-critical behavior remains uncertain.

Boundary challenge

For each material changed boundary, record:

  • the invariant that must hold;
  • the affected runtime root or supported consumer;
  • the strongest concrete counterexample;
  • a legitimate control from base source, callers, or an authoritative contract;
  • the patched source path for both cases; and
  • whether the result is supported, contradicted, or unresolved.

When a decision depends on a complete enum, allowlist, routing table, protocol matrix, identity class, state transition, or similar bounded domain, derive the partitions from an independent contract or an exhaustive self-contained new contract. Representative tests are not proof of completeness.

When behavior derives a new target or reuses saved authority, independently classify the derived URL, callback, nested resource, cached principal, historical object, retry, replay, or re-execution at the consuming policy decision. Inherited trust is not evidence of safety.

Apply these challenges when the patch contains the corresponding structure:

  • for aggregated policy inputs, verify that the property and resulting decision bind to the same individual subject;
  • after validation, trace mutation, interpretation, callbacks, retries, lazy initialization, and re-resolution to the first sensitive sink; and
  • for UI, discovery, prompt, instruction, or visibility changes, require capability removal or independent downstream enforcement before assigning authorization or isolation impact.

A trigger alone is not a defect. Mark the boundary contradicted only when source or an authoritative contract establishes a concrete cross-subject decision, post-validation bypass, or capability-preserving enforcement gap.

Strict auto-merge gate

Use auto_merge_candidate only when all of the following are true:

  • impact and likelihood are low;
  • regression protection is strong and relevant exact-head checks pass;
  • recovery is easy and confidence is high;
  • runtime reachability and ownership are established;
  • no privileged boundary, migration, persistent-state change, public contract change, architecture-specific rollout, or broad shared default is materially affected;
  • every material boundary challenge is supported;
  • no unknown, skipped required check, failed relevant check, or merge condition remains; and
  • status-quo risk is known.

Otherwise use human_review_required for a supported merge. Strong tests can lower likelihood and raise confidence, but never lower impact.

The validator enforces this gate and the recommendation-to-label mapping. A validation failure means the evidence packet is internally inconsistent; it is not permission to weaken a rating or omit evidence.

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1 warning27d3 checks · Risk SAFE
  • Gen Agent Trust Hub27d

    This skill includes security considerations related to the processing of untrusted patch data and the isolated execution of code for impact assessment. These activities are managed through explicit safety guidelines for isolation and instructions to treat external content as data rather than commands. See detailed analysis for context.

  • Socket27d

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  • Snyk27d

    Risk: MEDIUM · 1 issue

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