Threat Modeling Reference
Purpose: Detailed threat modeling methodologies for Breach. Read when: Building or reviewing a threat model for a target system.
2026 framing addition. Classical STRIDE / PASTA still apply, but the highest-impact 2026 threats live at two layers STRIDE was not built for. Add these as a sweep after the STRIDE pass before declaring the model complete:
- Agentic action surface (OWASP ASI 2026) — when an AI agent takes real actions (file writes, API calls, MCP tools, browser automation), model the goal-hijack / tool-misuse / memory-poisoning / cascading-failure paths from
ai-red-teaming.md. Anthropic's published~78.6%breach rate at 200 prompt-injection attempts against an unprotected GUI agent is the calibration point — assume the agent boundary is porous and the human-in-the-loop is load-bearing.- Supply-chain pipeline (Mini Shai-Hulud family, 2026) — model the build / publish / OIDC / SLSA-attestation chain as a first-class trust boundary. The 2026 in-the-wild worms abuse SLSA L3 attestations from hijacked
pull_request_targetworkflows, so a model that trusts the attestation without verifying signer identity + branch lineage is incomplete. Seesupply-chain-attack-design.md.
1. STRIDE (Default)
Microsoft's threat classification framework. Best for component-level analysis.
Process
- Diagram — Create a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system
- Enumerate — Walk each component/flow and apply STRIDE categories
- Prioritize — Rate each threat by likelihood × impact
- Mitigate — Map mitigations to each identified threat
STRIDE Template
## Threat Model: [System Name]
### System Overview
[Brief description and architecture diagram reference]
### Data Flow Diagram
[ASCII or reference to Canvas-generated diagram]
### Threats
#### [Component/Flow Name]
| # | Category | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|----------|--------|------------|--------|------|------------|
| T-01 | Spoofing | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-02 | Tampering | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-03 | Repudiation | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-04 | Info Disclosure | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-05 | Denial of Service | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-06 | Elevation | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |STRIDE Per-Element Mapping
| Element Type | Most Relevant STRIDE | Why |
|---|---|---|
| External Entity | S, R | Can impersonate or deny actions |
| Process | S, T, R, I, D, E | Full attack surface |
| Data Store | T, I, D | Data integrity and confidentiality |
| Data Flow | T, I, D | In-transit protections |
| Trust Boundary | S, E | Boundary crossing = privilege change |
2. PASTA (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis)
Risk-centric, 7-stage methodology. Best for business-aligned assessments.
Seven Stages
| Stage | Name | Activities | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Define Objectives | Align with business goals, compliance | Security objectives document |
| 2 | Define Technical Scope | Identify components, dependencies, APIs | Technical scope diagram |
| 3 | Application Decomposition | Map data flows, entry points, trust boundaries | DFD with trust boundaries |
| 4 | Threat Analysis | Identify threat agents and TTPs | Threat agent profiles |
| 5 | Vulnerability Analysis | Map known vulnerabilities to components | Vulnerability correlation matrix |
| 6 | Attack Modeling | Build attack trees and scenarios | Attack tree diagrams |
| 7 | Risk & Impact Analysis | Calculate risk scores, prioritize | Risk-ranked findings |
PASTA Template
## PASTA Threat Model: [System Name]
### Stage 1: Business Objectives
- Primary business function: [___]
- Regulatory requirements: [___]
- Risk tolerance: [High/Medium/Low]
### Stage 2: Technical Scope
- Components in scope: [___]
- External dependencies: [___]
- Data classification: [___]
### Stage 3: Decomposition
[DFD with trust boundaries]
### Stage 4: Threat Agents
| Agent | Motivation | Capability | Likelihood |
|-------|-----------|------------|------------|
| [External attacker] | [Financial] | [High] | [Medium] |
| [Insider] | [Disgruntlement] | [Medium] | [Low] |
### Stage 5: Vulnerability Correlation
| Component | Known Vulnerabilities | CVE/CWE | Exploitability |
|-----------|----------------------|---------|----------------|
| [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] |
### Stage 6: Attack Scenarios
[Attack trees or kill chain diagrams]
### Stage 7: Risk Ranking
| Finding | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Score | Priority |
|---------|-----------|--------|------------|----------|
| [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] |3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Map adversary behaviors to established technique taxonomy.
Key Matrices
| Matrix | Use Case | Techniques |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise ATT&CK | Traditional IT/cloud | 14 tactics, 200+ techniques |
| Mobile ATT&CK | Mobile applications | 14 tactics, 100+ techniques |
| ICS ATT&CK | Industrial control | 12 tactics, 80+ techniques |
| ATLAS | AI/ML systems | AI-specific adversary techniques |
ATT&CK Mapping Template
## ATT&CK Map: [System Name]
### Relevant Techniques
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Applicability | Test Priority |
|--------|-------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Execution | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Persistence | T1078 | Valid Accounts | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Credential Access | T1110 | Brute Force | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote Services | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |4. Attack Trees
Goal-oriented decomposition. Best for analyzing specific attack objectives.
Structure
[Root Goal: What the attacker wants to achieve]
├── [Sub-goal 1: Attack path A]
│ ├── [Leaf: Specific technique] [Cost: L] [Difficulty: M]
│ └── [Leaf: Specific technique] [Cost: M] [Difficulty: H]
├── [Sub-goal 2: Attack path B]
│ ├── [AND node: Requires both]
│ │ ├── [Leaf: Prerequisite 1]
│ │ └── [Leaf: Prerequisite 2]
│ └── [Leaf: Alternative technique]
└── [Sub-goal 3: Attack path C]
└── [Leaf: Specific technique] [Cost: H] [Difficulty: L]Annotations
| Attribute | Values | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Cost | Low / Medium / High | Attacker resource investment |
| Difficulty | Low / Medium / High | Technical skill required |
| Detection | Low / Medium / High | Likelihood of being caught |
| Impact | Low / Medium / High | Damage if successful |
Framework Selection Guide
| Criteria | STRIDE | PASTA | ATT&CK | Attack Trees |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Best for | Component-level threats | Business-aligned risk | Adversary emulation | Specific attack goals |
| Complexity | Low-Medium | High | Medium | Low |
| Output | Threat catalog | Risk-ranked findings | Technique coverage map | Goal decomposition |
| When to use | Default for most systems | Regulated/enterprise | Known adversary TTPs | Focused attack analysis |
INTERACTION_TRIGGERS Question Templates (SKILL.md excerpt)
SCOPE_DEFINITION
questions:
- question: "What is the scope of this red team assessment?"
header: "Scope"
options:
- label: "Application layer (Recommended)"
description: "Web/API endpoints, business logic, authentication, authorization, input handling"
- label: "AI/LLM system"
description: "Prompt injection, jailbreak, data poisoning, agentic risks, guardrail bypass"
- label: "Full stack"
description: "Application + infrastructure + CI/CD + supply chain"
- label: "Purple Team exercise"
description: "Collaborative Red/Blue with detection validation and SIEM rule tuning"
multiSelect: falseFRAMEWORK_SELECTION
questions:
- question: "Which threat modeling approach should be applied?"
header: "Framework"
options:
- label: "STRIDE (Recommended)"
description: "Categorize threats by Spoofing/Tampering/Repudiation/Info Disclosure/DoS/Elevation"
- label: "PASTA"
description: "Risk-centric 7-step process aligned to business objectives"
- label: "MITRE ATT&CK mapping"
description: "Map attack techniques to known adversary TTPs"
- label: "Attack Trees"
description: "Goal-oriented tree decomposition of attack paths"
multiSelect: falseSEVERITY_DISPUTE
questions:
- question: "How should this finding's severity be classified?"
header: "Severity"
options:
- label: "Critical"
description: "Remote code execution, auth bypass, or data exfiltration with no user interaction"
- label: "High"
description: "Significant impact requiring minimal attacker effort or privilege"
- label: "Medium"
description: "Moderate impact requiring specific conditions or elevated access"
- label: "Low"
description: "Limited impact, difficult to exploit, or defense-in-depth already mitigates"
multiSelect: false