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by shingo imotasimota/agent-skills85 stars
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Designing red team attack scenarios, threat models, MITRE ATT&CK/OWASP application, Purple Team exercises, and AI/LLM red teaming. Use when adversarial security validation is needed.

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/simota/agent-skills/breach

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referencethreat-modeling.md

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Threat Modeling Reference

Purpose: Detailed threat modeling methodologies for Breach. Read when: Building or reviewing a threat model for a target system.

2026 framing addition. Classical STRIDE / PASTA still apply, but the highest-impact 2026 threats live at two layers STRIDE was not built for. Add these as a sweep after the STRIDE pass before declaring the model complete:

  • Agentic action surface (OWASP ASI 2026) — when an AI agent takes real actions (file writes, API calls, MCP tools, browser automation), model the goal-hijack / tool-misuse / memory-poisoning / cascading-failure paths from ai-red-teaming.md. Anthropic's published ~78.6% breach rate at 200 prompt-injection attempts against an unprotected GUI agent is the calibration point — assume the agent boundary is porous and the human-in-the-loop is load-bearing.
  • Supply-chain pipeline (Mini Shai-Hulud family, 2026) — model the build / publish / OIDC / SLSA-attestation chain as a first-class trust boundary. The 2026 in-the-wild worms abuse SLSA L3 attestations from hijacked pull_request_target workflows, so a model that trusts the attestation without verifying signer identity + branch lineage is incomplete. See supply-chain-attack-design.md.

1. STRIDE (Default)

Microsoft's threat classification framework. Best for component-level analysis.

Process

  1. Diagram — Create a data flow diagram (DFD) of the system
  2. Enumerate — Walk each component/flow and apply STRIDE categories
  3. Prioritize — Rate each threat by likelihood × impact
  4. Mitigate — Map mitigations to each identified threat

STRIDE Template

## Threat Model: [System Name]

### System Overview
[Brief description and architecture diagram reference]

### Data Flow Diagram
[ASCII or reference to Canvas-generated diagram]

### Threats

#### [Component/Flow Name]

| # | Category | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|----------|--------|------------|--------|------|------------|
| T-01 | Spoofing | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-02 | Tampering | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-03 | Repudiation | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-04 | Info Disclosure | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-05 | Denial of Service | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |
| T-06 | Elevation | [Description] | H/M/L | H/M/L | [Score] | [Mitigation] |

STRIDE Per-Element Mapping

Element Type Most Relevant STRIDE Why
External Entity S, R Can impersonate or deny actions
Process S, T, R, I, D, E Full attack surface
Data Store T, I, D Data integrity and confidentiality
Data Flow T, I, D In-transit protections
Trust Boundary S, E Boundary crossing = privilege change

2. PASTA (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis)

Risk-centric, 7-stage methodology. Best for business-aligned assessments.

Seven Stages

Stage Name Activities Output
1 Define Objectives Align with business goals, compliance Security objectives document
2 Define Technical Scope Identify components, dependencies, APIs Technical scope diagram
3 Application Decomposition Map data flows, entry points, trust boundaries DFD with trust boundaries
4 Threat Analysis Identify threat agents and TTPs Threat agent profiles
5 Vulnerability Analysis Map known vulnerabilities to components Vulnerability correlation matrix
6 Attack Modeling Build attack trees and scenarios Attack tree diagrams
7 Risk & Impact Analysis Calculate risk scores, prioritize Risk-ranked findings

PASTA Template

## PASTA Threat Model: [System Name]

### Stage 1: Business Objectives
- Primary business function: [___]
- Regulatory requirements: [___]
- Risk tolerance: [High/Medium/Low]

### Stage 2: Technical Scope
- Components in scope: [___]
- External dependencies: [___]
- Data classification: [___]

### Stage 3: Decomposition
[DFD with trust boundaries]

### Stage 4: Threat Agents
| Agent | Motivation | Capability | Likelihood |
|-------|-----------|------------|------------|
| [External attacker] | [Financial] | [High] | [Medium] |
| [Insider] | [Disgruntlement] | [Medium] | [Low] |

### Stage 5: Vulnerability Correlation
| Component | Known Vulnerabilities | CVE/CWE | Exploitability |
|-----------|----------------------|---------|----------------|
| [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] |

### Stage 6: Attack Scenarios
[Attack trees or kill chain diagrams]

### Stage 7: Risk Ranking
| Finding | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Score | Priority |
|---------|-----------|--------|------------|----------|
| [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] | [___] |

3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Map adversary behaviors to established technique taxonomy.

Key Matrices

Matrix Use Case Techniques
Enterprise ATT&CK Traditional IT/cloud 14 tactics, 200+ techniques
Mobile ATT&CK Mobile applications 14 tactics, 100+ techniques
ICS ATT&CK Industrial control 12 tactics, 80+ techniques
ATLAS AI/ML systems AI-specific adversary techniques

ATT&CK Mapping Template

## ATT&CK Map: [System Name]

### Relevant Techniques

| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Applicability | Test Priority |
|--------|-------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Initial Access | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Execution | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Persistence | T1078 | Valid Accounts | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Credential Access | T1110 | Brute Force | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote Services | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | [H/M/L] | [H/M/L] |

4. Attack Trees

Goal-oriented decomposition. Best for analyzing specific attack objectives.

Structure

[Root Goal: What the attacker wants to achieve]
├── [Sub-goal 1: Attack path A]
│   ├── [Leaf: Specific technique]  [Cost: L] [Difficulty: M]
│   └── [Leaf: Specific technique]  [Cost: M] [Difficulty: H]
├── [Sub-goal 2: Attack path B]
│   ├── [AND node: Requires both]
│   │   ├── [Leaf: Prerequisite 1]
│   │   └── [Leaf: Prerequisite 2]
│   └── [Leaf: Alternative technique]
└── [Sub-goal 3: Attack path C]
    └── [Leaf: Specific technique]  [Cost: H] [Difficulty: L]

Annotations

Attribute Values Purpose
Cost Low / Medium / High Attacker resource investment
Difficulty Low / Medium / High Technical skill required
Detection Low / Medium / High Likelihood of being caught
Impact Low / Medium / High Damage if successful

Framework Selection Guide

Criteria STRIDE PASTA ATT&CK Attack Trees
Best for Component-level threats Business-aligned risk Adversary emulation Specific attack goals
Complexity Low-Medium High Medium Low
Output Threat catalog Risk-ranked findings Technique coverage map Goal decomposition
When to use Default for most systems Regulated/enterprise Known adversary TTPs Focused attack analysis

INTERACTION_TRIGGERS Question Templates (SKILL.md excerpt)

SCOPE_DEFINITION

questions:
  - question: "What is the scope of this red team assessment?"
    header: "Scope"
    options:
      - label: "Application layer (Recommended)"
        description: "Web/API endpoints, business logic, authentication, authorization, input handling"
      - label: "AI/LLM system"
        description: "Prompt injection, jailbreak, data poisoning, agentic risks, guardrail bypass"
      - label: "Full stack"
        description: "Application + infrastructure + CI/CD + supply chain"
      - label: "Purple Team exercise"
        description: "Collaborative Red/Blue with detection validation and SIEM rule tuning"
    multiSelect: false

FRAMEWORK_SELECTION

questions:
  - question: "Which threat modeling approach should be applied?"
    header: "Framework"
    options:
      - label: "STRIDE (Recommended)"
        description: "Categorize threats by Spoofing/Tampering/Repudiation/Info Disclosure/DoS/Elevation"
      - label: "PASTA"
        description: "Risk-centric 7-step process aligned to business objectives"
      - label: "MITRE ATT&CK mapping"
        description: "Map attack techniques to known adversary TTPs"
      - label: "Attack Trees"
        description: "Goal-oriented tree decomposition of attack paths"
    multiSelect: false

SEVERITY_DISPUTE

questions:
  - question: "How should this finding's severity be classified?"
    header: "Severity"
    options:
      - label: "Critical"
        description: "Remote code execution, auth bypass, or data exfiltration with no user interaction"
      - label: "High"
        description: "Significant impact requiring minimal attacker effort or privilege"
      - label: "Medium"
        description: "Moderate impact requiring specific conditions or elevated access"
      - label: "Low"
        description: "Limited impact, difficult to exploit, or defense-in-depth already mitigates"
    multiSelect: false

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

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  • Gen Agent Trust Hub13d

    The skill is a comprehensive security tool designed for red teaming, threat modeling, and adversarial simulation. It contains various examples of malicious patterns (such as prompt injections and social engineering pretexts) but these are explicitly presented as educational reference material and test cases for security professionals. No functional malicious code, unauthorized data access, or hidden exfiltration mechanisms were identified.

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  • Snyk13d

    Risk: LOW · No issues

  • ZeroLeaks5mo

    Score: 93/100 · 2 sections analyzed

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