APPI (Japan) Compliance Reference
Purpose: Implementation guidance for Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information (個人情報保護法, APPI) — original 2003, major amendments 2017, 2022, and the 2024 amendment cycle. Covers the three-tier data taxonomy (個人情報 / 仮名加工情報 / 匿名加工情報), Article 24 cross-border transfer regime, Article 23 opt-out for third-party provision, PPC notification thresholds, and 要配慮個人情報 (special-care PI) handling.
Scope Boundary
- cloak
appi: Japan-specific implementation (PPC reporting, three-tier taxonomy, Article 24 transfer, Article 23 opt-out filing, 要配慮個人情報 explicit consent). - cloak
gdpr(sibling): EU regime — overlaps on consent and DSAR shape, diverges on retention philosophy and lawful basis. APPI uses "purpose of utilization" (利用目的), not GDPR's six bases. - cloak
ccpa(sibling): California — opt-out by default. APPI is a hybrid: opt-in for sensitive, opt-in for third-party transfer (with Art. 23 opt-out exception), purpose-bound use otherwise. - cloak
pseudonymize(sibling): techniques.appiconsumes pseudonymization output and applies the 仮名加工情報 / 匿名加工情報 distinction to determine downstream obligations. - cloak
dpia(sibling): APPI does not mandate DPIA but PPC strongly recommends for large-scale or special-care processing. - canon (elsewhere): standards-level audit.
appiproduces operational compliance code. - crypt (elsewhere): encryption design backing the "appropriate safety management" duty (Art. 23 安全管理措置).
- canon (elsewhere): 個人情報保護方針 (Privacy Policy in Japanese), 利用目的の特定 wording, Tokushoho disclosures for EC.
- canon[regulatory] (elsewhere): ISMS / Pマーク (Privacy Mark) certification mapping; APPI is law, Pマーク is voluntary certification.
Workflow
DISCOVER → inventory 個人情報 / 個人データ / 保有個人データ
→ flag 要配慮個人情報 (sensitive); identify cross-border processors
CLASSIFY → three-tier taxonomy: 個人情報 vs 仮名加工情報 vs 匿名加工情報
→ determine 利用目的 (purpose of utilization) for each field set
MAP → domestic third-party transfers (Art. 23 opt-out filing path)
→ cross-border transfers (Art. 24 — equivalent country list / SCC-equivalent / consent)
ASSESS → consent surface for 要配慮個人情報, breach-notification thresholds (1k records or sensitive),
→ PPC reporting timeline (速やか — promptly), 3-year retention limit on access logs
REMEDIATE → consent UI for 要配慮; opt-out filing form for Art. 23;
→ cross-border addendum templates; pseudonymization pipeline for 仮名加工情報 reuse;
→ anonymization pipeline + deletion of intermediate keys for 匿名加工情報
VERIFY → PPC report channel tested, 利用目的変更 re-consent flow, retention auto-purge,
→ third-party recipient registry maintained for 3 years (Art. 26)Three-Tier Data Taxonomy
| Tier | Japanese | Definition | Re-identification | Permitted Use | Disclosure Duty |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Personal Information | 個人情報 | Identifies a living individual (incl. by combination) | N/A | Within stated purpose | Full DSAR rights |
| Pseudonymized Information | 仮名加工情報 | Cannot identify individual without additional info | Possible with key | Internal analytics; no third-party transfer except processors | DSAR exempt internally |
| Anonymized Information | 匿名加工情報 | Cannot identify individual; cannot be restored | Impossible (key destroyed) | Free use incl. third-party | DSAR exempt |
Critical distinction: 仮名加工情報 retains the key (held separately, access-controlled); 匿名加工情報 destroys the key irreversibly. Cloak must verify operationally — many implementations claim 匿名 but retain reversible mappings, making them 仮名 in fact.
仮名加工情報 standards (PPC rules): remove direct identifiers, remove descriptions enabling identification, remove individual identification codes (My Number, biometric IDs).
匿名加工情報 standards: same as above plus mandatory technical evaluation that re-identification is infeasible; public disclosure of categories created (Art. 43).
要配慮個人情報 (Special-Care Personal Information)
| Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| Race | 人種 (excluding nationality and skin color alone) |
| Creed | 信条 — religious or political beliefs |
| Social status | 社会的身分 — birth-based class |
| Medical history | 病歴 |
| Criminal record | 犯罪の経歴 |
| Crime victim status | 犯罪被害事実 |
| Physical / mental disability | 心身の機能の障害 |
| Health checkup results | 健康診断等の結果 |
| Medical guidance / treatment | 医師等による指導・診療・調剤 |
| Arrest / search / seizure | 刑事手続が行われたこと |
| Juvenile protection record | 少年保護事件の手続が行われたこと |
Acquisition and third-party transfer require explicit prior consent — opt-out under Art. 23 is unavailable.
Cross-Border Transfer (Article 24)
| Path | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Equivalent-protection country | EU and UK currently designated; transfer treated as domestic |
| SCC-equivalent contract | Bind recipient to APPI-aligned standards; document retention 3 years |
| Subject's prior consent | Disclose recipient country, that country's privacy regime summary, and recipient's safeguards (post-2022 amendment requirement) |
2022 amendment teeth: consent-based path now requires the substance of the foreign regime to be disclosed — generic "we may transfer abroad" no longer suffices. PPC publishes country fact-sheets businesses can reference.
Article 23 — Opt-Out for Third-Party Transfer
Domestic third-party transfer can use opt-out if all of the following are filed with PPC and disclosed to subjects:
| Item | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Categories of PI transferred | Specific list |
| Method of acquisition | Source description |
| Categories of recipients | Including geography |
| Method of transfer | Bulk, API, etc. |
| Subject's opt-out method | Functional channel |
| Date of opt-out filing | PPC submission date |
Excluded from opt-out path: 要配慮個人情報, illegally acquired PI, data acquired via opt-out from another business (no chain-opt-out).
PPC Notification (Article 26)
| Trigger | Threshold | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Breach of 要配慮個人情報 | Any record | Promptly (速やか — interpreted ~3-5 days speculative report; 30 days confirmed report) |
| Breach with financial damage risk | Any record | Same |
| Breach involving illegal purpose | Any record | Same |
| Breach >1,000 records | All other PI | Same |
Plus subject notification (or public announcement if individual notice infeasible). Cloak's appi recipe must wire both PPC API/form path AND subject-notification template.
2024 Amendment Highlights
| Change | Effect |
|---|---|
| Class action enablement | Consumer organizations can sue on behalf of victims |
| Strengthened PPC investigative powers | On-site inspection, document seizure |
| Statutory damages (under discussion) | Currently actual-damage only; reform proposes statutory minimums |
| Child PI special protection | Under-18 explicit protections expanded |
| Cookie / web tracking explicit rules | Closer to ePrivacy-style consent for tracking |
| Cross-border tightening | Annual recipient verification required |
Reform is staged — track PPC quarterly notices for in-force dates.
Anti-Patterns
- Calling pseudonymized data 匿名加工 — keeping the mapping table anywhere makes it 仮名加工情報 with all the duties (no third-party transfer, internal-use-only). Auditors check key-destruction logs.
- Generic "may transfer abroad" notice — post-2022, the foreign regime substance must be disclosed. Insufficient notice voids consent.
- Treating health-checkup results as ordinary PI — corporate wellness data is 要配慮個人情報. Explicit consent required even for HR processing.
- Single 利用目的 declaration covering everything — purpose must be specific enough to predict use. "For business purposes" fails Art. 17 specificity.
- Skipping the Art. 23 PPC filing for opt-out third-party transfer — without filing, the legal basis is consent, not opt-out. Most ad-tech vendors get this wrong.
- No retention limit on access logs — Art. 26 requires 3-year retention of disclosure/correction request records; longer creates liability.
- Conflating APPI with PIPL or PIPA — China's PIPL and Korea's PIPA share vocabulary but diverge on consent granularity, transfer regime, and breach thresholds. Don't reuse Chinese/Korean templates verbatim.
- Assuming 匿名加工情報 lets you skip privacy notice — Art. 43 requires public disclosure of categories of anonymized information created and method.
- Manual PPC reporting — the 速やか standard implies operational readiness. Build the channel before the breach.
Handoff
- To Crypt: encryption + key management for the 仮名加工情報 mapping table; key destruction protocol for 匿名加工情報 transition.
- To Canon: APPI ↔ ISO/IEC 27701 control mapping; Pマーク (JIS Q 15001) gap matrix when seeking certification.
- To Canon: 個人情報保護方針 (Privacy Policy) review in Japanese; 利用目的 specificity check; cross-border disclosure substance per 2022 standard.
- To Canon[regulatory]: ISMS scope alignment, Pマーク evidence package, audit trail design for PPC inspection.
- To Builder: PPC reporting endpoint, consent UI for 要配慮 categories, Art. 23 opt-out channel, transfer addendum signing flow.
- To Schema: tier annotations (
appi_tier: 個人 | 仮名 | 匿名), 要配慮 flags, 利用目的 column-level metadata. - To Gateway: cross-border-aware routing — block prohibited destinations at API edge.