/v4-security-foundations

v4 Hook Vulnerabilities Catalog

Common vulnerability patterns in Uniswap v4 hooks with detection methods and mitigations.

Critical Vulnerabilities

1. NoOp Rug Pull (CRITICAL)

Description: Hook with beforeSwapReturnDelta enabled returns a delta claiming to handle the swap but steals input tokens.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Do not use
function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Claims to handle swap but provides nothing
    BeforeSwapDelta delta = toBeforeSwapDelta(params.amountSpecified, 0);
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, delta, 0);
}

Detection:

• Check if beforeSwapReturnDelta: true in permissions
• Verify hook actually provides liquidity for claimed delta
• Audit all code paths that return non-zero deltas

Mitigation:

• Don't enable beforeSwapReturnDelta unless absolutely necessary
• If enabled, ensure delta is backed by actual liquidity provision
• Require multiple audits for hooks with this permission

2. Missing PoolManager Verification (CRITICAL)

Description: Hook callbacks don't verify caller is the PoolManager, allowing direct manipulation.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - No caller check
function beforeSwap(
    address sender,
    PoolKey calldata key,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata hookData
) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Anyone can call this directly!
    _updateState(params);
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary.ZERO_DELTA, 0);
}

Detection:

• Search for hook callbacks without onlyPoolManager or equivalent
• Check first line of each callback for msg.sender verification

Mitigation:

modifier onlyPoolManager() {
    require(msg.sender == address(poolManager), "Not PoolManager");
    _;
}

function beforeSwap(...) external onlyPoolManager returns (...) {
    // Safe
}

3. Delta Accounting Mismatch (CRITICAL)

Description: Hook returns deltas that don't balance, causing transaction revert or fund loss.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Deltas don't balance
function afterSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, int128) {
    // Takes tokens but doesn't account for them
    poolManager.take(currency, address(this), amount);
    return (BaseHook.afterSwap.selector, 0); // Wrong delta!
}

Detection:

• Trace all take(), settle(), and delta returns
• Verify sum equals zero for all code paths
• Fuzz test with random amounts

Mitigation:

function afterSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, int128) {
    uint256 amount = calculateAmount();
    // Bounds check: ensure amount fits in int128 to prevent overflow
    require(amount <= uint256(type(int128).max), "Amount exceeds int128 max");
    poolManager.take(currency, address(this), amount);
    // Cast sequence: uint256 → uint128 → int128
    // The uint128 intermediate prevents treating large values as negative,
    // since direct uint256 → int128 would misinterpret values > int128.max
    return (BaseHook.afterSwap.selector, int128(uint128(amount)));
}

High Severity Vulnerabilities

4. Reentrancy via External Calls (HIGH)

Description: Hook makes external call that reenters PoolManager before state is finalized.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Reentrancy possible
function afterSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, int128) {
    state = newState;
    externalContract.callback(); // Can reenter!
    return (BaseHook.afterSwap.selector, 0);
}

Detection:

• Identify all external calls in hook callbacks
• Check if state changes happen before external calls
• Look for ERC-777 tokens or contracts with callbacks

Mitigation:

import {ReentrancyGuard} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";

contract SecureHook is BaseHook, ReentrancyGuard {
    function afterSwap(...) external nonReentrant returns (bytes4, int128) {
        // BEST PRACTICE: Follow CEI pattern - state changes BEFORE external calls
        // The nonReentrant modifier is a safety net, not a replacement for CEI
        state = newState;
        externalContract.callback();
        return (BaseHook.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    }
}

5. Unbounded Loop DoS (HIGH)

Description: Hook iterates over unbounded array, causing out-of-gas.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Unbounded loop
function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    for (uint i = 0; i < participants.length; i++) { // Can grow forever
        _processParticipant(participants[i]);
    }
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary.ZERO_DELTA, 0);
}

Detection:

• Find all loops in hook callbacks
• Check if loop bounds are user-controllable
• Test with large arrays

Mitigation:

uint256 constant MAX_PARTICIPANTS = 100;

function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    uint256 len = participants.length > MAX_PARTICIPANTS ? MAX_PARTICIPANTS : participants.length;
    for (uint i = 0; i < len; i++) {
        _processParticipant(participants[i]);
    }
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary.ZERO_DELTA, 0);
}

6. Liquidity Lock (HIGH)

Description: beforeRemoveLiquidity can permanently trap LP funds.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Can lock funds forever
function beforeRemoveLiquidity(...) external returns (bytes4) {
    require(block.timestamp > unlockTime, "Locked"); // What if unlockTime is set to max?
    return BaseHook.beforeRemoveLiquidity.selector;
}

Detection:

• Check all conditions in beforeRemoveLiquidity
• Verify unlock conditions are achievable
• Look for admin-controlled lock parameters

Mitigation:

uint256 constant MAX_LOCK_DURATION = 365 days;

function setLockDuration(uint256 duration) external onlyAdmin {
    require(duration <= MAX_LOCK_DURATION, "Too long");
    lockDuration = duration;
}

Medium Severity Vulnerabilities

7. Price Manipulation via Single Block (MEDIUM)

Description: Hook uses single-block price for decisions, enabling manipulation.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Single block price
function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    uint256 currentPrice = oracle.latestPrice(); // Flashloan manipulable
    if (currentPrice < threshold) {
        revert("Price too low");
    }
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary.ZERO_DELTA, 0);
}

Detection:

• Find price/rate fetching in hooks
• Check if TWAP or multiple sources used
• Test with flash loan scenarios

Mitigation:

function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    uint256 twapPrice = oracle.getTWAP(30 minutes); // Use TWAP
    if (twapPrice < threshold) {
        revert("Price too low");
    }
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, BeforeSwapDeltaLibrary.ZERO_DELTA, 0);
}

8. Missing Slippage Protection (MEDIUM)

Description: Hook doesn't enforce user-specified slippage limits.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Ignores slippage
function beforeSwap(...) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    // Modifies amounts without checking slippage
    int256 modifiedAmount = params.amountSpecified * 99 / 100;
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(modifiedAmount, 0), 0);
}

Detection:

• Check if hookData contains slippage parameters
• Verify slippage is enforced when amounts modified
• Test with extreme market conditions

Mitigation:

function beforeSwap(
    address sender,
    PoolKey calldata key,
    IPoolManager.SwapParams calldata params,
    bytes calldata hookData
) external returns (bytes4, BeforeSwapDelta, uint24) {
    (uint256 minOutput) = abi.decode(hookData, (uint256));
    // Enforce slippage in hook logic
    require(calculatedOutput >= minOutput, "Slippage exceeded");
    return (BaseHook.beforeSwap.selector, delta, 0);
}

9. Fee-on-Transfer Token Mismatch (MEDIUM)

Description: Hook assumes transferred amount equals requested amount.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Doesn't account for transfer fees
function _handleTransfer(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) internal {
    token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
    balances[msg.sender] += amount; // Wrong if fee-on-transfer!
}

Detection:

• Find all token transfers
• Check if actual received amount is verified
• Test with fee-on-transfer tokens

Mitigation:

function _handleTransfer(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) internal returns (uint256 received) {
    uint256 balanceBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
    token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
    received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balanceBefore;
    balances[msg.sender] += received;
}

Low Severity Vulnerabilities

10. Hardcoded Addresses (LOW)

Description: Hook uses hardcoded contract addresses instead of parameters.

Issue:

// PROBLEMATIC - Hardcoded address
address constant ORACLE = 0x1234567890123456789012345678901234567890;

Mitigation:

address public immutable oracle;

constructor(IPoolManager _poolManager, address _oracle) BaseHook(_poolManager) {
    oracle = _oracle;
}

11. Missing Event Emissions (LOW)

Description: State changes not logged, making off-chain tracking difficult.

Mitigation:

event RouterAdded(address indexed router);
event RouterRemoved(address indexed router);

function addAllowedRouter(address router) external onlyAdmin {
    allowedRouters[router] = true;
    emit RouterAdded(router);
}

12. Unchecked Return Values (LOW)

Description: External call return values ignored.

Vulnerable Pattern:

// VULNERABLE - Ignores return value
token.transfer(recipient, amount);

Mitigation:

import {SafeERC20} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";

using SafeERC20 for IERC20;

token.safeTransfer(recipient, amount);

Vulnerability Detection Tools

Static Analysis

• Slither: slither . --detect all
• Mythril: myth analyze contracts/Hook.sol
• Solhint: solhint 'contracts/**/*.sol'

Dynamic Analysis

• Foundry Fuzz: forge test --fuzz-runs 10000
• Echidna: Property-based fuzzing
• Medusa: Parallel fuzzing

Manual Review Checklist

1. Trace all external calls
2. Verify all delta accounting
3. Check all access control
4. Review all state changes
5. Analyze all loops
6. Test all edge cases