Permissions and Elevation
Windows has no TCC-style permission grant for UI Automation. What controls access instead is integrity level: a Medium-integrity agent can observe and act on same-integrity applications, and the OS gates what crosses the boundary upward.
Same-Integrity Targets Need No Grant
- UIA reads (snapshot, find, get, is, screenshot) and same-integrity input work from any terminal with no permission prompt.
agent-desktop permissionsprobes UIA live rather than consulting a policy store:accessibilityreportsgrantedwhen UIA answers,automationreportsnot_required, andscreen_recordingreflects capture availability.- There is no
--requestdialog to trigger; ifaccessibilityreportsdenied, the cause is an integrity or policy boundary below, not a missing checkbox.
The UIPI Boundary
User Interface Privilege Isolation blocks synthesized input from a lower-integrity process into a higher-integrity one (Medium to High, such as an elevated Notepad):
- Reads cross the boundary. From Medium, UIA resolves an elevated target's
name, class, control type, pid, bounds and node count the same as a High
caller, and
WM_GETTEXTreads succeed. Observation is never refused across the boundary. - Writes do not. The adapter compares the integrity levels of the two
process tokens before it synthesizes anything, and a strictly higher target
returns
PERM_DENIEDwhoseplatform_detailreadsCOM HRESULT 0x80070005 (E_ACCESSDENIED: Access is denied). - Fix: run agent-desktop from a terminal elevated to the target's level, or act on elements that do not cross the boundary.
Detection Is a Token Read, Never a SendInput Verdict
SendInput's return value proves nothing: it reports success whether or not
the events landed. Only the token comparison above, or a re-read of the effect,
tells delivered from silently dropped. A target whose integrity level the
process cannot read is not assumed to be same-or-lower: the action proceeds
best-effort and is judged by re-reading its effect.
Window Activation Crosses the Boundary
focus-window succeeds against a higher-integrity target.
SetForegroundWindow is gated by the Windows foreground-lock heuristic (recent
input, AllowSetForegroundWindow), not by integrity. When foreground cannot be
confirmed before the budget runs out, a strictly-higher target returns an
activation-worded PERM_DENIED and an equal-integrity target returns
ACTION_FAILED.
Blocked Key Combos
press refuses dangerous shortcuts before synthesis. Every modifier order,
key alias (meta/cmd/super to win) and modifier superset is caught:
| Blocked | Why |
|---|---|
alt+f4 |
closes the active window |
win+l |
locks the session |
win+d |
shows the desktop |
alt+tab |
steals the foreground mid-run |
win+r |
opens Run over the target |
win+x |
opens the Quick Link menu over the target |
win+e |
opens File Explorer over the target |
ctrl+shift+esc |
opens Task Manager over the target |
Supersets such as alt+shift+tab are blocked too. --force overrides the
guard. ctrl+alt+delete is not on the list, because SendInput cannot
synthesize the Secure Attention Sequence at all.
Protected Processes
close-app refuses session- and shell-critical images by exact,
case-insensitive .exe name: csrss.exe, wininit.exe, winlogon.exe,
services.exe, lsass.exe, smss.exe, lsaiso.exe, dwm.exe,
explorer.exe. Other names close normally, including near-misses such as
explorer++.exe. A refusal is INVALID_ARGS.
Cross-Process Interaction Lease
Interactive work holds an exclusive, token-derived lock file, so two concurrent
agent-desktop processes cannot interleave focus changes, clicks and typing on
the same desktop. An inherited-handle mode
(AGENT_DESKTOP_INTERACTION_LEASE_HANDLE) lets a parent pass its lease to a
child after re-verifying identity and exclusivity. If acquisition fails, wait
for the other process to finish. Do not bypass the lease.
The Cursor Overlay's Control Pipe
The cursor overlay is a detached renderer process driven over a named pipe.
What is protected:
- Remote clients are rejected (
PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS). - Another user's process is refused in both directions: each connection's token user SID must match.
- Before it sends a control, the client checks that the pipe server's
executable is named
agent-desktop(case-insensitive, with or without.exe). This is a file-name check, not a signature check. A mismatch makesenablereportrendered: false. - One renderer per session (
FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE). A second renderer exits before it creates a window.
What is not protected: a same-user process on the same machine. The pipe has no security descriptor, and its name derives from the state root, the session id and the protocol generation. A same-user process can:
- hold the name first, so
enableanswersrendered: falsewhile it does (a missing overlay, never a fake one); - connect to a live renderer and move the drawn cursor or put any text in the label card.
The overlay is presentation-only. It never performs or fails an action and carries no credential. On a host where other people run processes as your account, do not trust what the overlay draws, and leave it disabled.