Index of every page on this site: llms.txt
All skills
waynesutton avatar

/sec-check

@853b196
Run it yourself

Security check and audit for Convex apps and any app with a React, Vite, Next.js, or Expo frontend, built from real incidents across shipped repos. Runs a secret scanner plus a per function surface ledger, then gates every candidate finding on a real attacker path before it gets a severity. Covers leaked keys, client prefixed secrets, public functions with no auth, caller identity taken from args, paid AI and AI Gateway spend, unsigned webhooks, open uploads, unsafe HTML, prompt injection into agent tools, component boundaries, derived data that outlives its source, status moves that skip steps, unbounded reads, and CI deploy keys. Use before any deploy, before making a repo public, when adding AI, webhooks, uploads, env vars, admin features, or agent tools, when reviewing AI generated code or a PR, when checking whether a security fix worked, or when the user says sec check, security check, security audit, pen test, find vulnerabilities, verify the fix, or is this safe to ship.

Use this Skill: https://skilld.dev/gh/waynesutton/builder-skills/sec-check

Nothing lands on disk. Nothing to clean up.

Fork this Skill

Edit a local copy. It keeps the author and licence.

referencesprobe.md

≈963 tokens on demand. Your agent reads this file only when SKILL.md points to it.

Manual checks and probing

Steps 6 and 7 of the quick check. Run them after the scanner, ledger, and finding gate.

Step 6: Manual checks the scripts cannot do

  • Every ledger review row has a reason you agree with, or a fix.
  • Any internalMutation called from a public wrapper receives ids the wrapper already verified.
  • Component calls (components.*) happen after the app function checks auth, since components have no ctx.auth. Every httpPrefix in convex.config.ts is a deliberate public surface.
  • Agent tools are listed, and each side effect tool is gated (rules 8 and 15).
  • Dev and prod use different keys, and prod env has no leftover bootstrap secrets.

Step 7: Probe your own deployment

Probe only deployments you own. Use dev or a preview, use dummy identities, and never call a paid action or send real email while testing.

First compare what is deployed with what the ledger expects. An old deploy can still serve functions the source already fixed.

npx convex function-spec --prod --file   # writes the deployed function list to a file

Then test auth logic with npx convex run. Without --identity the call runs signed out. With it, you act as a fake user.

npx convex run tasks:get '{"taskId":"<id owned by user a>"}'
npx convex run tasks:get '{"taskId":"<id owned by user a>"}' \
  --identity '{"subject":"probe-b","issuer":"https://probe.invalid","tokenIdentifier":"https://probe.invalid|probe-b"}'

Both should fail with an auth or not found error. npx convex run uses admin access and can call internal functions, so it proves the auth check, not visibility. To prove a function is unreachable from the internet, call it the way a browser would:

DEPLOY=https://YOUR-DEV-DEPLOYMENT.convex.cloud
curl -s "$DEPLOY/api/mutation" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path":"module:functionName","args":{},"format":"json"}'

Swap mutation for query or action as needed. Use type correct args, since a validator error never reaches the auth check and proves nothing. Expected: an auth error for gated functions, "could not find public function" for internal ones, and a projected shape for public ones.

Browser side checks

  • Open the network panel and inspect WebSocket and XHR responses for sensitive fields. Everything a query returns is visible there.
  • Hard refresh after deploying a security change, so cached subscriptions do not fool the test.
  • Mutations return ids or null, not stored objects.
  • New actions and integrations log full errors on the server only. The client gets a short message.
  • Source review and black box probing catch different halves. Do both. Code that looks gated but is not deployed yet, or an old deploy still serving open functions, only shows up in the probe.

GitHub secret scanning alerts

A second source for step 1. Each alert includes the secret value, so keep only safe fields:

gh api "repos/OWNER/REPO/secret-scanning/alerts?per_page=100" --paginate \
  --jq '.[] | [.number, .secret_type, .state, .validity, .publicly_leaked, .created_at[0:10]] | @tsv'
gh api repos/OWNER/REPO/secret-scanning/alerts/N/locations \
  --jq '.[] | [.details.path, .details.start_line, .details.commit_sha[0:7]] | @tsv'
  • A 404 with "Secret scanning is disabled" means no data, not a clean repo. Turn it on first (repo Settings, Advanced Security).
  • GitHub names secrets by prefix. A Clerk webhook secret is whsec_ from Svix, which GitHub labels "Stripe Webhook Signing Secret". Check the variable name at the alert's path and line before you call it a Stripe leak.
  • GitHub covers provider tokens. It misses Convex deploy keys, admin keys, and app logic. Keep running the scripts.
  • After you rotate a secret, close its alert as "revoked" in the repo's Security tab, so open alerts always mean live work.

Source: SKILL.md on GitHub

skilld matched fixed text patterns in SKILL.md and file names. Patterns miss obfuscated code.

skilld run checks every file with the same patterns. It asks for approval before it loads a Skill with a behavior marked Needs approval.

No alerts11d3 checks · Risk SAFE
  • Gen Agent Trust Hub11d

    This skill is a security auditing tool designed for Convex applications and React-based frontends. It provides automated scanning scripts and detailed remediation guidance to help developers find and fix vulnerabilities like leaked secrets, missing authentication, and unsafe data handling. The skill includes specific instructions to the AI agent to treat all audited code as data, effectively mitigating potential indirect prompt injection attacks from malicious repository content.

  • Socket11d

    No alerts

  • Snyk11d

    Risk: LOW · No issues

Signed by skilld at 853b196. This ties the file your Agent reads to that commit on GitHub. It does not review the instructions.

Last checked against GitHub 6 days ago.

Activeupdated last week

README badge

README badge for waynesutton/builder-skills/sec-check