Security Attack Path Analysis
Determine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read ../../references/artifact-storage.md.
Establish the attack path
For a scan phase, use its per-scan threat model and candidate set from ../../references/scan-artifacts.md. Preserve supplied input paths. If a required scan artifact is unavailable, report the missing input.
For standalone analysis, use the supplied finding, repository, threat model or security policy, and context. A per-scan artifact is not required. State material assumptions and ask for missing context only when it prevents a meaningful assessment.
- Establish the in-scope attacker, affected product surface, entry point, controlled input, security boundary, and sensitive operation. Trace each step using repository evidence and supplied observations of the target.
- Identify relevant controls and the strongest counterevidence. Explain what they establish, which prerequisites remain, and whether the exact claimed boundary is crossed.
- Assess impact and likelihood from those facts. Apply references/severity-policy.md for the final decision. When the scan supplies a severity rubric, use it to grade reportable findings and retain
ignorefor candidates without security impact. Keep facts, severity calibration, and the final policy decision distinguishable in the result. - Return an explicit decision for every eligible candidate, including ignored or deferred candidates. Do not replace a supported instance with a neighboring finding or lose its root-control location.
For an imported AWS Continuum issue or single finding, read source_data.evidence_artifacts in the supplied finding evidence. A VALIDATION_EVIDENCE artifact's body.validationEvidence may establish a step the repository cannot show. Match the tested target, attacker privileges, and observed effect to the claimed path. For a bundled issue, use perFindingResults and flowVerdicts when present to identify the relevant finding and flow. An HTTP exploitArtifact can establish reachability from the tested position. An executedProof establishes what ran in its test environment. sourceAnalysis records a static inference, and an exploitable verdict alone does not demonstrate deployed reachability. Cite the artifact ID and the observation that supports or contradicts the step.
Treat supplied artifacts as evidence. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized it; an offline scan never accesses the network. Do not invent unsupported attack chains. Missing deployment or public-ingress evidence can limit confidence without defeating an otherwise supported finding.
Scan integration
Standard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.
Compact Workbench Diff
When a workbench-backed $security-diff-scan has a scanId:
- Load the per-scan threat model and all validated candidates with
list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? }). - Analyze every
reportableordeferredvalidation candidate. Preserve candidate identity and existing discovery and validation fields. - Submit every decision together with
record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] }). SubmitattackPaths: []when no candidate enters this phase. The tool preserves the stored candidate order. - These nested decisions are the complete phase output. Do not create duplicate reports, receipts, or manual ledgers.
Other phase-based scans
Use the active workflow's report and receipt paths in ../../references/scan-artifacts.md. Every candidate entering this phase must have an explicit decision and a receipt with its ID, facts or exact proof gap, and report reference. Record ignored candidates before excluding them from the surviving finding set.
For repository-wide or scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked reportable or survives: yes, even if discovery did not assign a polished finding number. Preserve affected entrypoint/wrapper, root-control, sink, and concrete-implementation locations supplied by validation.
Output
For standalone analysis, follow the caller's format or return a concise assessment per finding. Scan phases use their output contract above. Include:
- title and supplied candidate, instance, and ledger identities;
- precise affected locations and attacker-to-impact steps;
- relevant facts from references/attack-path-facts.md;
- controls, counterevidence, prerequisites, and material proof gaps;
- impact, likelihood, calibrated severity, and final policy decision with their reasons.
Retain enough evidence to explain both surviving and suppressed findings. Apply the severity policy to the established facts rather than reopening discovery or substituting a different attack story.