Severity and Policy Guidance
Apply this policy after establishing the attack path, scope, and counterevidence. Start from the candidate's severity hypothesis and adjust it using the impact, likelihood, prerequisites, and mitigations supported by the repository and supplied validation evidence. Do not reopen discovery during calibration.
Grade reportable findings with the scan's rubric or, when none is supplied, the default severity rubric.
For SSRF, a documented outbound-request feature or optional operator filter does not defeat a demonstrated destination-control bypass. For CSRF, evaluate browser credential attachment, cookie policy, preflight, request parsing, and effective controls; method or JSON content type alone is not a categorical defense. For XSS, distinguish self-only effects from victim impact; an alert reproduction proves script execution but does not alone establish the severity.
Reportability
- Set
ignorefor a disproved finding or a bug without a meaningful security impact. - Do not discard a real, reportable finding solely because its impact or likelihood is low; use the corresponding lower severity.
- Apply hard suppression to self-only impact or unachievable/highly unrealistic prerequisites.
- Privileged-only, operator-only, developer-only, physical-access-only, or protected-write-path prerequisites imply
ignoreunless a privilege-escalation delta is the issue. - A realistic lower-privileged, in-scope attacker path can be established by repository evidence, supplied validation evidence, or both. Set
ignoreif the evidence does not support such a path.
Private or internal exposure alone does not suppress a supported authorization, identity, trust-boundary, or security-control failure in a real product or production workflow. Missing deployment or ingress evidence can lower confidence or leave facts unknown without defeating an otherwise supported finding.
Weight likelihood using the established attacker position and exposure:
remoteusually supports high likelihood when the attacker position is realistic and in scope;local_networkusually supports medium likelihood unless the evidence supports a different level;localhostusually supports low likelihood unless a lower-privileged attacker can realistically reach the listener;nonedoes not increase likelihood based on exposure.
Priority
Map the final reportable severity to a priority.
critical->P0high->P1medium->P2low->P3
An ignored finding receives an ignore decision and severity, with no priority.