/chain

IoC Database

Purpose: Curated, source-cited IoC tables per public supply-chain worm campaign. Read when: Scanning, classifying grade, or proposing IoC database PRs.

Each section is dated. When a new wave is published, add an entry with Source: <URL> and Reported: YYYY-MM-DD. Never invent IoCs.

Contents

• Mini Shai-Hulud 1st wave (2026-04)
• Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd wave (2026-05) — TanStack Router compromise
• S1ngularity (2024-08)
• lottie-player (2024-10)
• General npm Stage-1 launcher signatures
• General npm Stage-2 payload signatures
• General persistence signatures (cross-campaign)
• C2 / exfil channel signatures
• GitHub anomaly signatures
• Update checklist for new campaigns

Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd wave (2026-05) — TanStack Router compromise

Reported: 2026-05-12 Source: https://blog.flatt.tech/entry/mini_shai_hulud_2nd Cross-reference: StepSecurity advisory, TanStack postmortem (https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem), GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx Scale: 200+ npm packages compromised. UiPath, Mistral AI SDK, DraftLab among victims. CI/CD pipeline compromise as primary initial-access vector.

Stage-1 launcher (optionalDependencies pattern)

"optionalDependencies": {
  "@tanstack/setup": "github:tanstack/router#79ac49eedf..."
}

Stage-1 droplet files

Stage-2 payload (router_init.js embedded in @tanstack/react-router)

Stage-3 credential targets (file-based)

~/.aws/credentials
~/.aws/config
~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json
~/.azure/accessTokens.json
~/.kube/config
~/.vault-token
~/.ssh/id_rsa
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
~/.npmrc
~/.electrum/wallets
~/.ethereum/keystore
~/.monero
~/.config/Exodus
~/Library/Application Support/Ledger Live

Stage-3 cloud API probing (2nd-wave-specific)

Stage-4 exfiltration channels (3 parallel)

A. Primary C2

• hxxps://git-tanstack[.]com:443/router (POST)
• api[.]masscan[.]cloud/v2/upload (confirmed alternate)

B. Session Protocol (always-on parallel)

• Endpoint: hxxp://filev2.getsession[.]org/file/{id}
• Encryption: RSA-4096-OAEP + AES-256-GCM hybrid
• Seed nodes: seed1.getsession[.]org, seed2.getsession[.]org, seed3.getsession[.]org
• Recipient Session ID: 05f9e609d79eed391015e11380dee4b5c9ead0b6e2e7f...
• TLS pin: CN=seed1.getsession[.]org, issuer Oxen Privacy Tech Foundation

C. GitHub fallback (only on C2 failure)

• Repo naming pattern: {dune_word}-{dune_word}-{3-digit} (e.g. arrakis-fremen-042)
• Commit method: createCommitOnBranch GraphQL mutation (aliases b0, b1, ...)
• Commit message: "chore: update dependencies"
• Chunk size: 30 MB, base64-encoded

Stage-5 persistence

macOS

~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist

Linux

~/.config/systemd/user/gh-token-monitor.service
~/.config/gh-token-monitor/
~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh

Cross-platform IDE hooks

.claude/settings.json
.claude/setup.mjs
.claude/router_runtime.js
.vscode/tasks.json
.vscode/setup.mjs
.github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml   # attacker-added, masquerades as legitimate

Retaliation payload (critical)

gh-token-monitor polls every 60 seconds:

gh auth status  # or equivalent token-validity check
# On HTTP 40x response:
rm -rf ~/

npm token description hook:

IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner

→ Rotation must be gated on persistence eradication. This is the load-bearing rule for the whole skill.

Stage-6 worm propagation (maintainer-side)

1. Select npm tokens with bypass_2fa: true
2. Enumerate packages: https://registry.npmjs.org/-/v1/search?text=maintainer:{username}&size=250
3. Inject router_init.js + tampered package.json into target tarballs
4. CI/CD: obtain npm publish token via GitHub OIDC token exchange
5. PUT tampered tarball with valid SLSA Provenance (Build Level 3) attached

Runtime indicators

Mini Shai-Hulud 1st wave (2026-04)

Reported: 2026-04-29 Source: https://blog.flatt.tech/entry/mini_shai_hulud (companion article) Scale: 6 packages compromised. Initial access: Stolen npm publish tokens (not yet CI/CD). Persistence: IDE hooks only (no LaunchAgent / systemd). Exfil: GitHub only (no C2 / no Session Protocol).

Cross-wave indicators (also present in 2nd wave):

• IDE-hook implant paths (.claude/, .vscode/)
• GitHub repo creation with {dune_word} patterns
• Commits authored by claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>

When scanning a system that may have been hit by 1st wave, the absence of OS-level persistence does not imply absence of compromise — check IDE hooks and GitHub history independently.

S1ngularity (2024-08)

Reported: 2024-08-26 Targets: Nx-related packages. Cross-wave indicators:

• AI-CLI invocation harvesting (claude, agy, q CLI used to enumerate repos / credentials)
• GitHub repo s1ngularity-repository-* pattern
• Cryptocurrency wallet exfil (Electrum, Ethereum keystore)

Chain's propagation recipe specifically targets this maintainer-side pattern.

lottie-player (2024-10)

Reported: 2024-10-31 Targets: @lottiefiles/lottie-player npm package. Surface: Browser-side cryptocurrency wallet drainer (no OS persistence).

When matched: scope is browser tabs that loaded the package; OS-side IoCs are absent. Still escalate to triage because user wallets may already be drained.

General npm Stage-1 launcher signatures

These cross campaigns and should be flagged regardless of named family:

General npm Stage-2 payload signatures

General persistence signatures (cross-campaign)

C2 / exfil channel signatures

Passive log inspection only. Never curl, dig, or nslookup these from the suspect environment — that confirms infection to the attacker and may activate further payloads.

GitHub anomaly signatures

Update checklist for new campaigns

When adding a new campaign section:

1. Header: campaign name + first-reported date + cross-reference URL.
2. Initial-access vector (stolen-token / CI-pipeline / typosquatting / dependency-confusion / vibe-coding-supply-chain).
3. Stage table: launcher → payload → credential targets → exfil → persistence → propagation.
4. Per file: sha256 + canonical path + size.
5. Per network endpoint: host + port + URL pattern (defang with [.]).
6. Retaliation payloads: if revoke-on-detect or rm -rf-class, flag prominently — rotation runbook must be gated on persistence eradication.
7. Source citations: at least two independent sources for CONFIRMED IoCs (vendor advisory + maintainer postmortem ideally).
8. Update the live-malware routing and quick-reference content in chain/SKILL.md if the family introduces a new persistence surface or retaliation hook.
9. Bump the ioc_database_version value emitted in _STEP_COMPLETE to the new commit date.

Never copy raw exfil URLs without defanging. Defang scheme (https → hxxps) and TLDs (com → [.]com) so the reference file is not itself a click-trap.

Critical Patterns Quick Reference (SKILL.md excerpt)