/chain

Scan Procedures

Purpose: OS-specific scan commands, passive log inspection, maintainer-side propagation audit, and the hardening checklist. Read when: Running the scan, shai-hulud, lockfile, propagation, or harden recipe.

All scans are read-only by default. Deletion / modification commands belong to eradication-playbook.md. Never make outbound network calls to suspected attacker hosts.

Contents

• Pre-scan: scope confirmation
• macOS scan
• Linux scan
• Windows / WSL scan
• Container image scan
• CI runner scan
• Lockfile-only scan (no FS traversal)
• Passive network log inspection
• Maintainer-side propagation audit
• Hardening checklist

Pre-scan: scope confirmation

Before any scan, capture the environment fingerprint. This is also the input to _STEP_COMPLETE.Output.target.

# Identity (no creds emitted)
uname -srm
sw_vers 2>/dev/null || cat /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null
echo "shell=$SHELL user=$USER home=$HOME pwd=$PWD"

# Package managers present
command -v npm pnpm yarn bun deno corepack 2>/dev/null
command -v pip pipx poetry uv 2>/dev/null
command -v gem cargo go 2>/dev/null

# Lockfiles in cwd (no traversal yet)
ls -1 package-lock.json pnpm-lock.yaml yarn.lock npm-shrinkwrap.json \
      requirements.txt Pipfile.lock poetry.lock uv.lock \
      Gemfile.lock Cargo.lock go.sum 2>/dev/null

# Recent install windows
ls -lat ~/.npm/_logs 2>/dev/null | head -10
ls -lat ~/.cache/pnpm 2>/dev/null | head -10

If suspected campaign install window known (e.g. Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd: 2026-05-12 onward), narrow scope to artifacts mtime-after that date first; widen if nothing found.

macOS scan

Persistence: LaunchAgents (per-user)

# Inventory
ls -la ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ 2>/dev/null
ls -la /Library/LaunchAgents/  2>/dev/null

# IoC match — Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd
find ~/Library/LaunchAgents /Library/LaunchAgents \
  -name 'com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist' 2>/dev/null

# Inspect any unfamiliar plist (read-only)
plutil -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents/<file>.plist

Flag every plist whose ProgramArguments references bun, deno, unfamiliar node paths, or scripts under ~/.config/, ~/.local/, /tmp/.

IDE-hook implants

# Project-scoped (cwd) and home-scoped
find . ~/. -maxdepth 6 \( \
    -path '*/.claude/setup.mjs' -o \
    -path '*/.claude/router_runtime.js' -o \
    -path '*/.claude/settings.json' -o \
    -path '*/.vscode/setup.mjs' -o \
    -path '*/.vscode/tasks.json' -o \
    -path '*/.github/workflows/codeql_analysis.yml' \
  \) 2>/dev/null

For each match, capture sha256 and mtime before any classification.

Live processes

ps -ax -o pid,user,etime,command \
  | grep -E 'tanstack_runner|router_runtime|gh-token-monitor|bun .*router_init' \
  | grep -v grep

A live match → grade ACTIVELY_BLEEDING. Do not kill yet; document first, then proceed to eradication-playbook.

Runtime artifacts

find /tmp -maxdepth 2 -name 'tmp.ts*.lock' -mmin -10080 2>/dev/null    # last 7 days
find /private/tmp -maxdepth 2 -name 'tmp.ts*.lock' -mmin -10080 2>/dev/null

Recent npm install windows

ls -la ~/.npm/_logs/ | head -30
grep -l 'optionalDependencies' ~/.npm/_logs/*.log 2>/dev/null | head -5

File quarantine staging (read-only check)

mkdir -p "/tmp/chain-malware-quarantine-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
# Do NOT move files yet. The directory is staged for eradication phase.

Linux scan

Persistence: systemd user units

# Inventory
systemctl --user list-unit-files --no-pager 2>/dev/null | head -50
ls -la ~/.config/systemd/user/ 2>/dev/null

# IoC match — Mini Shai-Hulud 2nd
find ~/.config/systemd/user -name 'gh-token-monitor.service' 2>/dev/null
find ~/.local/bin -name 'gh-token-monitor.sh' 2>/dev/null
find ~/.config/gh-token-monitor -type f 2>/dev/null

Cron + at + anacron

crontab -l 2>/dev/null
ls -la /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/ 2>/dev/null
at -l 2>/dev/null

Shell rc files

grep -nE 'curl |wget |source .*\.(sh|mjs)|node -e ' \
  ~/.bashrc ~/.zshrc ~/.profile ~/.bash_profile 2>/dev/null

IDE-hook implants (same as macOS — paths are identical)

Live processes

ps -eo pid,user,etime,cmd \
  | grep -E 'tanstack_runner|router_runtime|gh-token-monitor|bun .*router_init' \
  | grep -v grep

Windows / WSL scan

Persistence — Scheduled Tasks

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Author -notmatch 'Microsoft|Adobe|<known>'} `
  | Select TaskName, TaskPath, Author, State

Run keys

Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'

WSL distributions

WSL distros are effectively Linux from this skill's perspective. Run the Linux scan inside each distro:

wsl -l -v
wsl -d <distro> -- bash -c 'ls ~/.config/systemd/user 2>/dev/null'

Distro-side IDE hooks (.claude/, .vscode/) are reachable from Windows under \\wsl$\<distro>\home\<user>\ — but always scan from inside the distro to preserve mtime fidelity.

Container image scan

For a built image (not a running container):

# Layer inventory
docker history --no-trunc <image>:<tag>

# Filesystem snapshot via export (no run)
docker create --name husk-tmp <image>:<tag>
docker export husk-tmp | tar -tvf - \
  | grep -E '(\.claude|\.vscode|gh-token-monitor|router_init)'
docker rm husk-tmp

If a malicious package version is in the base image's lockfile, the eradication runbook becomes "rebuild from clean base + repinned lockfile," not "delete files from a running container."

CI runner scan

GitHub Actions runner artifacts (when the runner is yours, not GitHub-hosted ephemeral):

# Self-hosted runner workspace
find /home/runner /var/lib/github-runner -maxdepth 8 \
  \( -name 'codeql_analysis.yml' -o -name 'setup.mjs' -o -name 'tanstack_runner.js' \) 2>/dev/null

# OIDC token exchange logs (recent, suspicious)
# Check Actions audit log for OIDC issuance to unexpected audiences (npm)

For GitHub-hosted ephemeral runners, the eradication target is the workflow config + secrets, not the runner FS — runners are discarded per job. Coordinate with gear to rebuild the workflow.

Lockfile-only scan (no FS traversal)

Fast pre-merge check. No find, no process inspection, no network.

# npm
node -e '
const lock = require("./package-lock.json");
const bad = new Set([
  "@tanstack/react-router@<known-bad-version>",
  // populate from reference/supply-chain-malware-ioc-database.md
]);
for (const [name, info] of Object.entries(lock.packages || {})) {
  const v = info.version;
  if (v && bad.has(name.replace(/^node_modules\//,"") + "@" + v)) {
    console.log("MATCH:", name, v, info.resolved);
  }
}
' 2>/dev/null

# pnpm — pnpm-lock.yaml
grep -E '/@tanstack/react-router@|/@nx/' pnpm-lock.yaml | head -20

# yarn — yarn.lock
grep -E '"@tanstack/react-router@' yarn.lock | head -20

For Python:

grep -E '^(<known-bad-package>)==' requirements.txt Pipfile.lock 2>/dev/null

Output the exact line and the resolved URL (tarball hash if present). Cross-reference against ioc-database.md version table.

Passive network log inspection

Do not probe attacker hosts. Read locally available logs only.

# macOS — Unified Log (recent outbound)
log show --predicate 'process == "node" OR process == "bun"' \
  --info --debug --last 7d 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -iE 'git-tanstack|masscan|getsession|filev2'

# Linux — journalctl
journalctl --user --since '7 days ago' 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -iE 'git-tanstack|masscan|getsession|filev2'

# Cross-platform — DNS resolver cache (if any)
# macOS:
sudo killall -INFO mDNSResponder 2>/dev/null
log show --predicate 'process == "mDNSResponder"' --last 7d 2>/dev/null \
  | grep -iE 'git-tanstack|getsession'

# tcpdump capture (if running) — DO NOT initiate new capture if it would alert the attacker

Match against the C2 list in reference/supply-chain-malware-ioc-database.md. Any positive match → CONFIRMED.

Maintainer-side propagation audit

For a maintainer whose npm publish token may have been used:

# Enumerate your packages (use a separate, uncompromised session to log in)
npm whoami
npm access list packages --json | head

# Check publish history on each package
for pkg in $(npm access list packages --json | jq -r 'keys[]'); do
  echo "=== $pkg ==="
  npm view "$pkg" time --json | jq 'to_entries | sort_by(.value) | reverse | .[0:5]'
done

# Cross-check each recent version's provenance attestation
for pkg in $(npm access list packages --json | jq -r 'keys[]'); do
  v=$(npm view "$pkg" version)
  npm view "$pkg@$v" --json | jq '.dist.attestations // "no-provenance"'
done

# GitHub Actions OIDC issuance audit (org-level)
gh api "orgs/<org>/audit-log?phrase=action:oidc_token_issuance" --paginate \
  | jq '.[] | select(.created_at > "2026-05-01")'

A publish you did not initiate with no SLSA provenance or with an unexpected audience claim → propagation confirmed. Escalate to triage and notify npm (npm security@npmjs.com).

Hardening checklist (independent of grade)

npm

# Globally disable lifecycle scripts during install
npm config set ignore-scripts true
# Per-install:
npm ci --ignore-scripts

.npmrc (project or ~/.npmrc):

ignore-scripts=true
min-release-age=7        # Dependency Cooldown — refuse packages younger than 7 days
fund=false
audit=false              # rely on lockfile pinning + provenance; npm audit is noisy
provenance=true          # require provenance attestation when publishing

pnpm

pnpm-workspace.yaml or .npmrc:

ignore-scripts=true
package-manager-strict=true
minimum-release-age=10080            # minutes (= 7 days)
trust-policy=no-downgrade            # refuse downgrade of trusted packages

yarn (berry)

.yarnrc.yml:

enableScripts: false
enableHardenedMode: true
checksumBehavior: throw

Python

pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
# Use uv with hash-locked lock file:
uv pip compile requirements.in -o requirements.txt --generate-hashes

GitHub Actions

• Pin every third-party action to full commit SHA, never @v1 / @main.
• Use OIDC for cloud auth (permissions: id-token: write), never long-lived AWS / GCP secrets.
• Set workflow-level permissions: to least-privilege (contents: read default).
• Never use pull_request_target with actions/checkout of the PR head.
• Enable secret scanning + push protection at the repo level.
• Sign deployment artifacts with Sigstore / Cosign.

Registry proxy (organization-wide)

• Use Verdaccio / Sonatype Nexus / Artifactory / Takumi Guard as a pinned mirror.
• Reject packages younger than min-release-age.
• Reject packages without provenance for security-critical dependencies.
• Quarantine new versions for human review before promotion.

IDE / Claude Code

• Pin every skill via chain .chain-manifest.json; re-verify on session start.
• Block .claude/setup.mjs / .vscode/setup.mjs from being executed at workspace open (Hone hook).
• Disable workspace-trust auto-grant; require explicit "trust this folder" per repo.

Renovate / Dependabot

Renovate config.json:

{
  "minimumReleaseAge": "7 days",
  "configMigration": true,
  "rangeStrategy": "pin",
  "vulnerabilityAlerts": {"enabled": true},
  "packageRules": [
    {"matchManagers": ["npm"], "minimumReleaseAge": "10 days"}
  ]
}

Reporting

Maintain a written incident-response runbook that names:

• Who owns the npm publish token rotation (and the backup human if they're unavailable)
• Where the IoC database lives (chain/reference/supply-chain-malware-ioc-database.md)
• The current ioc_database_version and last-update date
• Pre-authorized actions: launchctl unload / systemctl --user stop on a named persistence unit may be auto-executed; everything else requires human sign-off

Output contract for scan

Each scan emits, per matched IoC:

- ioc_family: mini-shai-hulud-2nd
  surface: persistence | droplet | lockfile | process | network | git-log
  path_or_evidence: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
  sha256: <if file>
  mtime: 2026-05-12T14:33:21Z
  size_bytes: 487
  source: https://blog.flatt.tech/entry/mini_shai_hulud_2nd
  source_date: 2026-05-13

Aggregate findings, classify grade, and only then proceed to eradication.